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United States Forces, European Theater

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DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES AND

RECOVERED ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL

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MISSION: Prepare report and recommendations concerning policies, staff responsibilities, and operational activities of Civil Affairs and Military Government in connection with the care, control and repatriation of displaced persons, refugees, and recovered Allied military personnel.

The General Board was established by General Order 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945 as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics and administration employed by the United States Forces in the European Theater.

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THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
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DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES, AND RECOVERED
ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL

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THEATER GENERAL BOARD
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DISPLACED PERSONS, REFUGEES, AND
RECOVERED ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL

PART ONE

GENERAL

CHAPTER 1

THE DISPLACED PERSONS PROBLEM

1. German Slave Labor Policy. A logical outgrowth of the German theory of the super-race, was the conclusion that members of other so-called "inferior" peoples could and should be exploited on a slave basis. The subjugation of minorities in Germany prior to the outbreak of war on 2 September 1939, is significant in that it provided the Nazi party with an experimental laboratory, in which to test its theories of labor exploitation. Such notorious concentration camps as BUCHENWALD and DACHAU were the product, not of war-time needs for impressed labor, but of the pre-war days of 1933 and 1934. It should be noted that the German policy which produced the displaced persons problem was one inherent in the core of Nazism. This fact conditioned both the magnitude of the problem and the difficulty of handling individuals who had lived under it.

2. Displaced Persons the Spoils of War. The commencement of military operations by Germany in 1939 saw immediate execution of the policy indicated in Par 1. Millions of persons fell into German hands and they, without exception, were treated and regarded as property, a part of the spoils of war. This policy continued to be pursued in unoccupied portions of Germany, virtually up to the moment of occupation or surrender.

3. Liberation: Assumptions and Reality. Implicit in the planning for care and control of displaced persons was the assumption that the individuals would be tractable, grateful and powerless, after their domination for from two to five years as the objects of German slave policies. They were none of these things. Their intractability took the form of what was referred to repeatedly by officers in contact with them as "Liberation Complex". This involved revenge, hunger, and exultation, which three qualities combined to make displaced persons, when newly liberated, a problem as to behavior and conduct, as well as for care, feeding, disinfestation, registration, and repatriation. During the combat phase, this problem assumed critical proportions at times.

4. Intelligence Available to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. At the time of the approval of the first appreciation of Plan OVERLORD¹(Note), the intelligence available as to the nature and extent of the displaced persons problem was meager. Gross numbers could only be estimated by the claims of Governments in Exile. Some of these claims were deliberately exaggerated in order to lead the German authorities to believe they had exhausted the supply of slave labor or to cover the activities of underground resistance groups and patriotic activities. Even less trustworthy were the data as to locations both

¹(Note): Refers to the Bibliography, which is located at the end of each Part.

by national origins and by sex. Estimates of the total impressed labor force ranged from 6,000,000 to 14,000,000. How many had been "liquidated", how many had died under the lash, how many had been moved from the occupied territories into GERMANY, were matters of conjecture.

5. Displaced Persons and Refugees. Hand in hand with the problems foreseen in connection with slave labor went those of civilians driven out of their communities by the impact of combat. Whereas the former were largely displaced persons, that is, persons outside their own countries because of the war, the latter were refugees, persons within their own countries but removed from their homes because of the war. Though similar in many respects, this difference in status required differences in their handling. Refugees could in most instances be easily billeted with their fellow-nationals, whereas displaced persons could not.

6. Displaced Persons and Refugees alike might be either of Allied nationality or of enemy, ex-enemy, or co-belligerent nationality. The latter classes included individuals who had been loyal to the Allied cause or had been persecuted and mistreated by their own governments because of race, religion, color, or previous political activities.

7. Stateless Persons. As soon as repatriation or resettlement was considered, a further class of individuals came into being--those who had no governmental allegiance--due to the fact that their own national government, whether Allied or enemy, no longer existed. They imposed problems not common to other groups and had to be considered in planning.

8. Borderline Cases. Operations developed still another class of individuals, calling for differing treatment: individuals native to areas close to international frontiers, who did not know to which group they belonged. Typical of these were residents of the EUPEN (K-7928)--MERMERY (K-7806) area, many of whom had lived under German, then Belgian, then German, and yet again Belgian authority. Their problems were exceedingly difficult and each individual had to be considered as a special case.

9. Effect of These Classifications. It appears that recognition of these various classes was necessary from the beginning. Justice and the announced objectives of the Allied governments both demanded that appropriate treatment be given to the various groups, and that their administration be coordinated. The effect on planning, however, was to make it exceedingly complicated. Moreover, arbitrary decisions could not be reached since each national government had a specific and proper interest in its own nationals, and expressed it freely. Forty-seven nationalities were represented among the displaced persons found in the 12 Army Group area of Germany--an indication of the polyglot nature of the problem, and of the international implications involved.

CHAPTER 2

PRE-OPERATIONAL PLANNING FOR DISPLACED PERSONS

10. Effect of Long-range Planning. The effect of long-range planning was to insure that among the personnel recruited for

Civil Affairs/Military Government were a representative selection of welfare and executive personnel, chosen to conduct displaced persons and refugee operations. Qualified individuals in federal, state, and municipal welfare organizations were included, as well as officers who handled the evacuation of the Japanese on the West Coast, participants in the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps Project.^{2,3,4}

11. Planning under Operation OVERLORD. Upon the approval of the first appreciation of Plan OVERLORD,¹ a basic plan was evolved and issued by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEP). 21 Army Group and 1 United States Army Group each prepared a detailed plan and appreciation of the extent of the problem in the respective areas. The evaluation of 1 United States Army Group was issued 27 March 1944,² and covered the extent to which the problem of refugees and displaced persons was likely to affect military operations within the United States Zone during the period D to D plus 90.

12. Detail of 1 United States Army Group Appreciation. The appreciation prepared by 1 United States Army Group considered the normal populations of the area of initial lodgment and reviewed what was known about the evacuation of civil populations by the Germans. The conclusion was drawn that largely the evacuated persons had been sent to rural communes, and accordingly were not concentrated within a small area. It also noted what was known about collective camps for evacuated children, who numbered between 100,000 and 200,000, and the number of Organization Todt workers in the area. It then proceeded to the following conclusions:

"a. Displaced Persons.....

- "(1) The evacuated persons have been moved to a considerable distance from their homes, hence in most cases cannot expect to return except when furnished transportation.
- "(2) In most cases many of the displaced persons have already been absent from their homes for several months and have probably become partially adapted to local living conditions.
- "(3) A large part of the coast area and port cities have been completely evacuated. In order to obtain local laborers for assistance to military operations, it will be necessary to return evacuees to the port cities and coastal areas.
- "(4) It is difficult to estimate how many of the displaced persons will attempt to return home. Judging on the basis of experience in Italy, the Germans will encourage the return of as many displaced persons as possible in order to clog transport and supply routes. This movement is likely to increase in volume as the operation progresses and the advance uncovers a large number of the displaced persons.

"b. Refugees. Undoubtedly, a considerable proportion of the inhabitants of urban centers will either attempt to

flee or will be forced into our lines by the Germans. On the basis of experience in ITALY, it is believed that plans should be made to handle at least 500 such refugees in each Corps area each day and in case cities having a population of 5,000 or more are being uncovered, it is believed that plans should be made to handle at least 10% of the population of such cities as refugees."

13. Further Planning Prior to D-Day. The following excerpt from the After Action Report, 12 Army Group,⁶ indicates the further planning that was engaged in prior to D-Day:

"Before invasion, complete plans for the control and care of refugees and displaced persons had been developed and forwarded to the various Armies. Many conferences were held with members of the Army Staffs to discuss and refine the detailed plans. The staff of First US Army was assisted in the preparation of plans for the initial stages of the Normandy landings. Plans for the establishment of refugee camps were completed, personnel for the operation of these camps were instructed and briefed, and the initial stocks of supplies and equipment for them were included in the lift for the period ending D plus 14. While it was believed that a large part of the coastal area had been evacuated, plans were made for the use of landing craft for the evacuation to ENGLAND of civilians at the rate of 2,000 per day in case the Germans forced large numbers into the beachhead area." (Par 2, Section X, After Action Report, G-5 Section, Headquarters 12 Army Group).

The detailed plan was contained in Annex No. 2, Joint Administrative Plan, Operation OVERLORD, 19 April 1944.⁷ This in turn was based on an earlier plan, the Civil Affairs Annex, Operation RANKIN C, 1 March 1944.⁸

14. Appraisal. These plans made the most of the meager intelligence available as to the presence of displaced persons and the probable movements of refugees in the areas to be uncovered in NORMANDY. They provided facilities, personnel, and supplies for a reasonable number of displaced persons or refugees. They also provided an emergency means for the evacuation of abnormally large numbers to ENGLAND, in case such numbers were thrust upon us in a narrow beachhead. They did not clarify the status to be accorded to members of the Organization Todt, the German labor organization.

CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONS IN FRANCE, D DAY TO ARDENNES CAMPAIGN (D PLUS 193)

15. Displaced Persons Operations, D to D Plus 45.

a. The bulk of the operations during this period involved French refugees rather than displaced persons. As had been forecast, portions of the population in the area occupied prior to D plus 45 had been evacuated. Within a few days after capture of each town, the civil population began filtering back and on an average, towns had from 25 to 30 per cent of their normal population by the tenth day after liberation. The immediate problems were food, housing, and health. As the operations took place in summertime, it had been expected that shelter would not be a major problem. The continuous rains following D-Day, however, made shelter an early problem. Improvisation of shelter from ruined buildings was hampered by the

extensive booby-trapping engaged in by the Germans. Few relief supplies were available, but French local authorities appointed by Civil Affairs, utilized indigenous supplies to feed the civil population and also distributed the limited imported supplies.

b. The displaced persons uncovered included former members of the Organization Todt, who were treated as prisoners of war. Plans for the evacuation of displaced persons and refugees to ENGLAND were not invoked. No large-scale attempt was detected, on the part of the Germans, to push large numbers of civilians through the lines to embarrass our effort.

c. A large number of French refugees were rapidly absorbed into normal civilian community life. Towns were placed "off limits" to military personnel, a move which had, among others, the effect of conserving the limited food supplies available for civilian.

d. Fortunately, few problems in public health arose. Exposure to the elements resulted in some temporary illnesses, but no epidemics were reported.

e. During this period, two displaced persons camps were opened, one in the vicinity of CHERBOURG and one in the vicinity of ST. MERE EGLISE (T-3697). These camps accommodated both displaced persons and refugees and were operated by First US Army. As the advance progressed further to the south, it was necessary to open successive displaced persons centers, and as rapidly as possible refugees were dispersed and absorbed into the civilian population.

16. Displaced Persons Operations, D Plus 45 to D Plus 81 (Liberation of PARIS).

a. The advance of Third US Army was so rapid during this period that civilian populations were overrun without evacuation, and towns and cities were found more fully populated as the advance progressed. The liberation of RENNES found an estimated 50 per cent of the population (80,000) in the city; of Laval (J-6946), an estimated 70 per cent; of LE Mans (K-4137), an estimated 60 per cent. As order was restored in these cities, more of the population returned.

b. The Third US Army employed one Civil Affairs "D" detachment to map and post acceptable secondary routes for the movement of civilian refugees. This project, begun at AVANCHES, was continued throughout Third US Army zone until the network of roads allocated for civilian travel reached the vicinity of the German frontier.

c. Few displaced persons (as distinct from refugees) were encountered; and the rapid revitalization of the French local government enabled the French in most cases to assume responsibility for displaced persons who were liberated.

d. A special situation was encountered in BRITANNY, especially at BREST (V-9599) and at NANTES (O-0564). During a series of brief armistices civilians were transferred from German held territory to US controlled territory. These transfers of population assumed major proportions and in early September 20,000 such refugees were evacuated from BREST (V-9599). These refugees were accommodated in the towns and villages of the surrounding area. Altogether, before the fall of BRITANNY ports, approximately 300,000 such refugees were brought out and were accommodated mainly by the French.

17. Displaced Persons Operations from D Plus 81 to D Plus 193.

a. The advance of First US Army through northern FRANCE and BELGIUM largely paralleled the experiences of Third US Army. Larger and larger percentages of normal populations were encountered in the cities; and the local governmental authority accepted responsibility for refugees and displaced persons as they were liberated, in the main.

b. With the slowing down of the advance, there arose the problem of returning refugees to their towns and villages. Beginning at approximately 15 October 1944, this retrograde movement of the civilian population began to assume major proportions. In general, the armies regulated the movement to accord with security and traffic restrictions.

c. Tactical units reported villages to which the civilian populations might return. The French department and regional officials procured for each village a cadre of acceptable civilians, screened both by the French authorities and by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). Such a cadre usually included a mayor, selected artisans, and some cattle tenders. They were instructed to choose the least damaged house in the village and make such emergency repairs as would make it livable, round up and care for the cattle, and then proceed to repair other houses, beginning with the least damaged. In general, cadres were furnished for ten to fifteen towns per day by this means, without interrupting military traffic or hindering tactical operations.

d. After the crossing of the MEUSE River, displaced persons (as distinct from refugees) began to be encountered in large numbers. They included Soviet citizens and Poles who had been held as forced labor, particularly in connection with the mines of eastern FRANCE and BELGIUM. The arrival of units of the French Mission Militaire Liaison Administratif (MMLA) in early September 1944 considerably augmented the forces available for running camps. Each of the armies established a comprehensive system of collection, with suitable services operating from collection points to camps. Displaced persons were directed to the collecting points by military police and were then transferred to the camps. Armies decentralized to corps the function of operating, supplying, and supervising these camps. As the winter set in, a continual flow of displaced persons separated itself from the civilian population and the intake of the camps continued to mount steadily.

e. As populations in displaced persons centers increased, it became apparent that it would be necessary to arrange for large scale movements to the west of the MEUSE. Several factors were considered. Among them were:

- (1) Continued increase in the number of displaced persons.
- (2) Exhaustion of local food resources.
- (3) Continued difficulty in securing acceptable accommodations.

f. Accordingly, the movement of large numbers of displaced persons into the Communications Zone was arranged. Some movements were by rail, others by motor. There was some sorting by nationality in connection with the movements.

18. Functioning of Displaced Persons Centers. Available buildings at displaced persons centers were almost without exception badly damaged, and materials for their repair were in acute shortage. Foodstuffs were exceedingly limited. The arrival of imported Civil Affairs stocks was at best uncertain. The weather was severe, making indoor accommodation necessary. Fuel was critically short and many of the buildings did not have operable heating plants. Displaced persons cut wood for fuel. Both the members of the MSLA teams (feminine) and the field staff of the American Red Cross assisted Civil Affairs detachments in the operation of the camps; in some cases MSLA teams ran a number of camps under the supervision of a single Civil Affairs detachment. Thus, at one period there were 15 camps in the vicinity of HAYANGE (U-7389) and ERROUVILLE (U-6792) under the direction of a single Civil Affairs detachment assisted by four teams of the MSLA. Recreation and school programs were organized in the camps. Certain camps became "transit centers", notably the one at VERVIERS (K-6632), BELGIUM, and the one at VERDUN (U-2865).

19. Organization and Conduct of Movements. The organization of displaced persons movements into the Communications Zone proved to be a difficult problem. Neither the detachments nor the transportation authorities had had experience in movements of this sort. The first movements by train comprising 6,000 Soviet citizens from Third US Army area involved many unexpected details. The experience gained in this and other movements proved to be invaluable in organizing the mass movements which characterized the repatriation program from GERMANY. In December 1944, 40 telephone calls were involved in each movement of a train of 1,000 to 1,500 displaced persons. Such details as containers for water enroute, distribution of food, provision of blankets, the arrangement for medical and nursing service, and securing of train facilities, originally had to be dealt with one by one. Soon, however, they became routine and a standing procedure was adopted.⁹

20. Condition at End of Period. At the end of the period cited, there were approximately 14,000 displaced persons in the zone of the armies comprising 6 and 12 Army Groups. These were mostly accommodated in camps. Substantially all of the refugees, approximating 1,000,000, had been absorbed in their own communities. Six thousand displaced persons had been moved from the area east of the MEUSE River into Communications Zone (Com Z). The displaced persons were receiving the allocated 2,000 calories a day and were sheltered in buildings with as much comfort as the circumstances and accommodations available permitted. Special programs were in operation for dealing with the sick, aged, and orphans. Most of the displaced persons had been dusted with DDT powder. No cases of typhus had been encountered, although upon the fall of METZ (U-8659) it was discovered that there had been typhus among displaced persons in that city as recently as July 1944.

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PART TWO

REFUGEE ACTIVITIES IN A RETIREMENT (ARDENNES CAMPAIGN)

CHAPTER 1

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT

21. Action in Corps and Armies.

a. After 16 December 1944, Corps G-5 staffs took prompt action on the subject of refugees. Civil Affairs detachments were given emergency evacuation instructions. Certain routes were made available for refugee movements; Military Police prevented movement by civilians on the main roads. Some of the first towns overrun were so quickly captured by the Germans that there was little opportunity for evacuation. In others, a proportion of the population elected to remain. Civil Affairs detachments were among the last to leave before the arrival of the Germans, and one such detachment was overrun and captured.

b. Army G-5 staffs also acted promptly. Through their liaison officers and through SHAEF Missions, national authorities of BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG were asked to issue emergency proclamations urging civilians not to evacuate unnecessarily, and to stay off military routes. These requests were promptly complied with. Army staffs arranged accommodations and transportation for evacuees. All available accommodation immediately behind forward areas was utilized before refugees were sent to areas further in the rear. This policy had the effect of creating a progressively larger refugee mass comparatively close to forward positions. Unquestionably it was based in part on the estimate of the situation which indicated that the German advance could be stopped; the limited road-net and heavy winter conditions also influenced the decision.

c. Emergency arrangements were made for feeding refugees as they evacuated. The number was increasing with each westward move but supply lines were being progressively shortened.

d. Civil officials and members of the Belgian and Luxembourg Resistance Movement who had carried on activities against the Germans were evacuated wherever possible.

22. Action at Army Group Headquarters.

a. Army group initiated arrangements by which clearance was secured from SHAEF for the movement across national frontiers into FRANCE, if necessary, of 25,000 refugees from BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. It was arranged that this number could be moved without further notice to SHAEF or to the French government, as an emergency measure, if necessary. At the same time, arrangements were made with Oise Section, Com Z, to accept 25,000 refugees on short notice.

b. Preparations were made for the rapid clearance, if necessary, of up to 300,000 such refugees and a plan was agreed upon with Oise Section, Com Z, for the reception and billeting of this number of refugees in cities and towns along rail routes in FRANCE, should a mass evacuation become a necessity.

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c. Estimates were made based upon the assumption that when division rear boundary reached a political subdivision, it would then be necessary to evacuate the personnel of that subdivision. This was in effect a phased schedule of movements. Refugees would initially be moved only from one political subdivision to the next, in order to avoid widespread dispersion.

d. There was virtually no movement of refugees from LUXEMBOURG or BELGIUM into FRANCE, except those who had bona fide relatives in areas near the frontier and who could consequently be accommodated without official action.

e. The phasing system of planned evacuations operated well. National authorities listed all available accommodations in each political subdivision. At the peak there were covered accommodations available for less than 1400 individuals in unoccupied LUXEMBOURG. The next move to the rear of division rear boundaries would have sent approximately 20,000 refugees into FRANCE. Fortunately, this move was not necessary.

23. Action at SHAEF. SHAEF requested the French government to authorize the movement of refugees into FRANCE. Since these requests received prompt action, SHAEF prepared additional plans for the dispersal of refugees laterally into other army group areas as well as to the rear.

24. Action at Hq Communications Zone, ETOUSA.

a. Upon advice by army group as to the situation, Hq Com Z immediately authorized direct communication with Oise Section and empowered Oise Section to make commitments for emergency care and reception of refugees directly with army groups.

b. At the same time, Hq Com Z contacted other base sections and arranged, if necessary, for the distribution of refugees throughout FRANCE by billeting in cities and towns along rail routes and a further dispersal by truck movements. Com Z advised army group that it could accommodate 500,000 if considered operationally necessary by army group, on comparatively short notice. At the same time, AC of S, G-5, of Com Z advised that all facilities of Advance Section, Com Z, (ADSEC) were available both for the evacuation of refugees to the rear for lateral transportation between army groups and for the establishment of emergency clothing and distributing centers at designated localities.

CHAPTER 2

RETURN OF REFUGEES AFTER LIBERATION

25. Narrative. Upon the assumption of the offensive by the allied armies, it was deemed desirable to return refugees to their homes as rapidly as possible. The questions which arose were largely those of security; and a line was established to the west of which refugee movements were permitted. This line was advanced progressively, until the area embraced all of the overrun territory. Generally, the line was established at or near corps rear boundary. As had been done in LORRAINE, cadres were organized and returned to the villages in advance of the bulk of the population. Such few cattle as remained in the area were rounded up and given care. Emergency food supplies were distributed on a very meagre ration and a limited quantity of materials for repairs and reconstruction were made available.

26. Transfer to National Authorities. Shortly after 1 March 1945, army rear boundaries cleared the German frontier, and the area responsibility passed to Com Z. Almost immediately upon the completion of this transfer, authority and responsibility for refugee activity in the area were transferred to the national authorities.

CHAPTER 3

DISPLACED PERSONS IN A REFUGEE RETIREMENT

27. Statement of Problem. At the time of the German advance into the ARDENNES there were approximately 4500 Western European displaced persons in the area, mostly at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8414) and ESCH (P-73-2-1). They had been clothed with US Class "X" uniforms and were employed as laborers by ADSEC. At the time of the German attack it was felt that their presence in these uniforms constituted a security threat as they could be used as "cover" for enemy agents operating in the area.

28. Action Taken. Accordingly, arrangements were made for the prompt but orderly movement of these displaced persons into FRANCE. This move was made under difficult weather conditions and involved in the case of those at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8414), a truck haul of approximately 20 miles. One of the trains was attacked by German aeroplanes while leaving the area and casualties were sustained. Experience gained in this operation indicated the importance of adequate medical and nursing care on all movements of displaced persons.

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PART THREE

DISPLACED PERSONS OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

CHAPTER 1

PRIOR PLANNING

29. Cabinet and War Department. The problem of displaced persons in GERMANY was of such magnitude as to cause grave concern at the highest governmental levels. Within the US Cabinet, plans for handling these unfortunates were being considered as early as 29 October 1942.

30. SHAEP Long-range Plans.

a. Long-range planning with respect to the displaced persons problem culminated in the Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons (in liberated territories), dated 4 June 1944.¹ The policy of the Supreme Commander was set forth as follows:

- (1) To prevent any hindrance to military operations which might be occasioned by massing or uncontrolled movement.
- (2) To prevent and control outbreaks of disease among refugees and displaced persons which might threaten the health of the military forces.
- (3) To relieve, as far as practicable, conditions of destitution among refugees and displaced persons.
- (4) To set up an organization to effect the rapid and orderly repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, which could be handed over, in due course, to the appropriate civilian authorities.

b. The responsibility of Commanding Generals of army groups towards refugees and displaced persons (in liberated territories) was directed to be discharged normally through Allied national authorities concerned. Thus it may be said that within liberated territories, the objective of displaced persons/refugee operations was to free the armies, insofar as possible, from the handicap of civilian movements. The control, care, and movement of these civilians was made the responsibility of the Allied national authorities, subject to supervision by military commanders.

c. The Outline Plan for Refugees and Displaced Persons¹ indicated that negotiations were then under way towards concluding agreements with the USSR in the matter of repatriating Soviet nationals, and also the part to be played by the USSR in the return of the United Nations personnel uncovered by the advancing Red armies. Further, mention is made of an agreement, then apparently in the discussion phase, between the Supreme Commander, AEF, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).

Restricted

d. The Outline Plan¹ may be summarized as follows:

- (1) It prescribed operations in liberated territories.
- (2) Responsibility for care, control, and repatriation ~~was placed~~ in the hands of national authorities concerned.
- (3) Reference is made to agreements, then in a formative stage, with the Soviet government, and with UNRRA.
- (4) Armies were, insofar as possible, freed from displaced persons/refugee problems.

31. SHAFF Administrative Memorandum No. 39.²

a. The displaced persons problem in GERMANY differed greatly from that within liberated territories. Where there were thousands of political prisoners, slave laborers, and prisoners of war in the western European nations, there were millions inside GERMANY, to whom the populations of FRANCE, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, and THE NETHERLANDS were sympathetic. The return of these people to their homelands offered threats to the security of the armed forces and menaced the health of many nations throughout the world. Displaced persons, once GERMANY had been penetrated, were a major military objective.

b. A detailed memorandum, "Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany", was issued by SHAFF, 18 November 1944.² Its provisions differ in many respects from those of the "Outline Plan",¹ and included:

- (1) The liberation, care, and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons was announced as a major allied objective. All available resources at the disposal of military commanders were to be employed to accomplish this objective as a direct military responsibility. As soon as military conditions would permit, UNRRA was to be requested by the Supreme Commander to undertake this responsibility.
- (2) The control and repatriation of enemy and ex-enemy displaced persons was to be a responsibility of the German authorities, acting under the direction of Allied Military Government authorities. UNRRA could not, under its existing charter,³ assume responsibility for these persons in GERMANY.
- (3) In general, the details of the Supreme Commander's policy, enunciated in the "Outline Plan",¹ were reiterated. To these details was added the directive that "the German authorities make provision as necessary for the maintenance, care, and disposition of enemy or ex-enemy displaced persons and refugees".
- (4) Operational Phases: Displaced persons/refugee work, inside GERMANY, was divided into two

phases: The first period included that in which the advance was opposed by hostile action. The second phase included the period after Military Government had been imposed on GERMANY, in whole or in part. During the opposed advance, Military Government detachments assigned to displaced persons work were to be stationed at assigned locations as they were uncovered in GERMANY; normal military chain of command was to be employed together with G-5 technical channels. After imposition of Military Government, military district commanders were to relieve advancing armies, to as great an extent and as rapidly as possible, of displaced persons operations. The operations were then to proceed through the displaced persons executive (DPX).

- (5) DPX: The displaced persons executive consisted of: (a) the staff and executive personnel from headquarters staffs at SHAEF and subordinate units; (b) Military Government detachments assigned to DPX work; (c) combat and service personnel detailed by commanders to administer processing centers for United Nations displaced persons; (d) WAC personnel, designated at times and in areas deemed suitable by commanders; (e) displaced persons staff officers of the Control Commission (British) and the US Group Control Council (attached); (f) UNRRA personnel, under certain provisions. It provided that the technical channel could be used for communications between DPX, SHAEF, and DPX of subordinate units.
- (6) International Administration of Displaced Persons and Refugees: During the period of combat operations SHAEF assumed over-all administrative control of the care, control, and repatriation of displaced persons and control of refugees. Chief liaison officers for allied governments concerned formed part of SHAEF, to advise and assist in this administration. The allied governments, represented by FRANCE, NORWAY, THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, YUGOSLAVIA, POLAND, and DENMARK, expressed their readiness to cooperate with SHAEF, and with other allied governments concerned, in the care, control, and repatriation of displaced persons, with utmost expediency.⁴ GREECE and CZECHOSLOVAKIA informally expressed a similar intention. An attempt was being made to coordinate displaced persons activities with the USSR. Arrangements for the repatriation of displaced persons from processing centers in GERMANY to reception centers in their own countries, and repatriation of German displaced persons from assembly centers in allied countries to areas which were a responsibility of SHAEF in GERMANY, were to be made through the SHAEF Missions to the Governments concerned or in the event of no such Mission, to the government itself.

- (7) Responsibility for United Nations displaced persons, as vested in military district commanders after Military Government was imposed, included their care, control, movement, feeding, protection, registration, health, safeguarding of property, and opportunity to serve with either the armed forces of their own countries or with labor battalions. The repatriation movements out of military districts were a further responsibility imposed. The payment of wages, care, shelter and medical attention, was made a German responsibility, and priority over the needs of the German population was directed.
- (8) Upon invitation of SCACF UNRRA was authorized by the United Nations to undertake the care, relief, and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons. The care of German displaced persons and refugees was not included. UNRRA staff officers were to be integrated with other staffs working on displaced persons problems. Specialist personnel, both administrative and operations were available to military commanders on call through command channels. In short, UNRRA was preparing to handle the entire field of displaced persons/refugees operations as applied to United Nations nationals.
- (9) Allied liaison officers were made available for attachment to military commanders, on call, to assist in carrying out the repatriation mission. Subject to the military commander's decisions, they were authorized to carry out the wishes of their own governments in regard to care, control and repatriation of their nationals. It must be noted that, as directed, the work of these liaison officers was not to be limited to their own nations.
- (10) Processing centers, assembly centers, and border control stations were set up and their functions listed.
- (11) Procedure for dealing with special classes of displaced persons was instituted. These classes included persons claiming United Nations prisoner-of-war or civilian-internee status; members of an enemy para-military or of a collaborationist organization captured while not in uniform; United Nations nationals demobilized from enemy military or para-military organizations; non-interned British and US displaced persons requiring assistance or documentation; neutral displaced persons, stateless persons, and persons persecuted because of race, religion or activities in favor of United Nations.
- (12) Details for the repatriation movement were prescribed, as were the report and returns required.

- (13) Suggested tables or plans for organization of centers were attached, with other appendices.

32. Army Group Planning.

a. Twelfth Army Group. Operations in GERMANY, pertaining to displaced persons and refugees, were the subject of a planning program of the G-5 Section, 12 Army Group, prior to receipt of SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 39.² Based on the "TALISMAN" plan,⁵ of SHAEF 12 Army Group published Operational Instructions No. 5, 30 September 1944.⁶ This was later coordinated with SHAEF Memorandum No. 39, by amendment to the 12 Army Group Instructions.

b. Sixth Army Group. Sixth Army Group planned for displaced persons operations in GERMANY prior to 3 December 1944. Operational Memorandum No. 2, Hq 6 Army Group, dated 3 December 1944,⁷ generally prescribed the procedure to be followed in handling displaced persons in terms similar to those of SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No. 39.²

33. Army Level Planning. Third US Army. The provisions of SHAEF "Outline Plan"¹ and of Administrative Memorandum No. 39,² were incorporated in army plans.^{8,9}

CHAPTER 2

OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

34. Operational Background. Events prior to the invasion of GERMANY assisted in clarifying the displaced persons/refugee situation to some extent. No longer was the problem of these exiles left solely to Military Government detachments. The problem was accepted as a major military objective, and all means at the disposal of military commanders were directed towards its solution. The ARDENNES counter-offensive presented the threat of a large-scale exodus; machinery was set up to control this movement. The capture of TRIER (L2129) by the Third US Army gave practical experience to displaced persons teams in the mobilization of resources; collection and assembling of displaced persons and ex-prisoners of war; segregation into national groups; shelter, clothing, feeding, preservation of health, and registering individuals; and other important details of evacuation.

35. Movement Across Frontiers. SHAEF had directed a "standfast" policy prior to the invasion of GERMANY. Under this policy no uncontrolled movement was to be permitted. Western Europeans, British and US nationals were to be collected and returned to the country of origin with all dispatch. Eastern Europeans (Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Soviet citizens) were to be collected, held in assembly centers, and under an agreement yet to be made with the USSR, to cross Soviet lines for repatriation. The presence of these Eastern Europeans in army areas was a threat to military operations. Pending SHAEF decision, army group commanders and army commanders invoked operational necessity in order to clear forward areas of these persons. During the period in which the German frontier was wholly or in part within divisional areas, they were cared for in corps and army areas. But with the advance of army rear boundaries across the frontier, eastern European displaced persons could be moved into liberated territories only as a military commitment, and not a responsibility of the government of the country concerned.¹⁰

36. Difficulties Encountered.

a. Housing. Combat troops were given priority on all facilities and until army rear boundaries cleared the frontier (approximately 10 March 1945) little in the way of shelter for displaced persons could be made available. Caserne Kimmel, at TRIER (I-2129), and Caserne Lutzow, at BRAND, near AACHEN (K-8242), became sorting centers to which displaced persons were transferred and segregated. Similarly, ALSDORF (K-8955), north of AACHEN, was used as a displaced persons sorting center.

b. Communications. The prescribed method of reporting numbers of displaced persons involved too great a time lag for figures obtained to be useful in planning within 12 Army Group. A telephone net was established, by which populations of camps and estimates of displaced persons in army, corps, and division areas were reported. Although these reports were often estimated or only approximated, they were of material assistance in further planning.

c. French Border Control Plan. Many authorities prior to D-Day and until December 1944, believed Germany would surrender without a fight on German soil. Based on this assumption, the French believed there would be a great deal of road movement by DP's, and very little rail movement. Accordingly, the French border reception stations were placed at frequent intervals from left to right. In December it became evident that GERMANY must be conquered within the confines of the Reich, and that DP evacuation must of necessity follow rail-lines. A change in the French plan was recommended, to place the centers in depth from front to rear. The revision was made in March 1945 and the French authorities established automatic daily reception quotas. The French made no distinction between recovered Allied military personnel (RAMP) and DP's. The daily quota of each camp was reported to agencies interested in repatriating former prisoners of war as well as units charged with care and control of displaced persons. Confusion resulted. A camp with a reception capacity of 5,000 persons a day would often receive 10,000 - 5,000 DP's together with 5,000 RAMP. It finally devolved upon 12 Army Group to coordinate these simultaneous movements for the entire US Zone of GERMANY.

37. German Frontier to the Rhine. Estimates of slave labor in the Rhineland, as of September 1944, indicated there were 640,000 displaced persons in that area. Intelligence reports indicated large-scale movements of these people to the East. An estimate made on 19 January 1945 led higher headquarters to believe 150,000 displaced persons would be encountered before the Rhine was crossed. This figure was surprisingly accurate. Control of these individuals was difficult. During this period, the insufficiency of trained personnel became apparent. Repeated requests had been made to SHAETF for additional personnel, including UNRRA personnel. By 15 March a total of 7 UNRRA teams came forward. The movements of Eastern Europeans into FRANCE continued to be an acute problem. It was foreseen that huge numbers of Soviet citizens, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, and nationals of Eastern Europe, pouring into FRANCE could not be absorbed. On 12 March 1945 a further westward movement of these Eastern Europeans was stopped, and the armies were faced with the problem of controlling, feeding and housing the greatest mass movement of history. Trained workers in the forward areas cleared persons from combat zones; workers in rear areas screened, and disinfected them and arranged for repatriation. Inspection of 23 camps in

12 Army Group area in March 1945 showed two excellent camps, one unsatisfactory, and the rest as satisfactory or fair. The following steps were taken to remedy this condition:

a. Additional personnel was requisitioned.

b. Improvement of methods with respect to sanitation, orderliness, cleanliness and feeding.

c. Assistance to the mobile labor service, in recruiting Eastern Europeans for mobile labor battalions.

d. Expediting the recruiting of Poles for the Polish armed forces.

e. Steps were taken to improve the supply situation.

38. The Rhine Crossing. The Rhine was crossed at REMAGEN (F-6620) 7 March 1945. A bridge-head of less than 15 square miles was established, and within this confine were found 3,500 displaced persons. This figure indicated a density that could be expected in future operations. Large numbers of IP's were uncovered by the other armies bridging the river and moving deeper into GERMANY. The Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 Section, SHAEF, reported in the weekly summary dated 24 March 1945,¹¹ that approximately 115,000 displaced persons were uncovered in GERMANY since 3 March. 72,000 were held in GERMANY, 43,000 returned to FRANCE, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, and LUXEMBOURG.

39. Operations Beyond the Rhine. Prior to the envelopment of the Ruhr pocket, many displaced persons had been evacuated by the Germans to the East and South. Army commanders, complying with SHAEF Administrative Memorandum 39,² detailed combat troops to temporary duty caring for and controlling displaced persons.

40. Personnel. The increasing numbers of displaced persons encountered, coupled with the lengthening repatriation lines, called for more and more trained personnel. Repeated requests were made for UNRRA teams, but that organization was unable to furnish the numbers asked. By 20 April 1945 some 50 "Spearhead" teams were operating for UNRRA. These teams were functioning with 55% authorized personnel, usually with two captured vehicles. The maintenance of these vehicles was difficult, as spare parts were not available. The personnel shortage was met, in part, by the use of recovered Allied military personnel. 12 Army Group permitted former prisoners of war to be employed in staffing displaced persons centers, where such employment would not unduly delay their evacuation. Many were recruited by UNRRA further to assist that organization to accomplish its mission. Allied liaison officers were called forward with some reluctance by military commanders. The hesitation of these commanders in availing their commands of such potentialities was caused in part by the erroneous belief that liaison officers were permitted to work only with nationals of their own country. In the main, control over IP's was exercised by local military commanders utilizing their own forces.

41. IP Centers. Prior plans for IP centers were not adequate. Center populations of 2,000 - 3,000 inhabitants had been expected. In practice these populations usually ran to figures above 10,000, and in one case to approximately 40,000. In most cases these shelters were Wehrmacht casernes. Due to aerial bombardment or the effect of artillery fire these casernes were

often partly destroyed. Newly liberated persons looted, robbed, murdered, and in some cases destroyed their own shelter. Generally, the water systems of communities had been partially destroyed, causing sanitation to become a major problem. Meals, while nourishing and adequate, tended to become monotonous. Two daily servings was the usual rule in newly opened camps, each serving consisting of a stew made of pulses, meat and vegetables, usually augmented by locally baked bread. Two thousand calories daily were prescribed, and the burden of furnishing food items fell on the local German government. Only in cases where the resources were inadequate to furnish this supply were the military commanders permitted to divert army food stores to IP use. Recovered Allied military personnel were authorized 3600 calories a day.

42. Lengthening Repatriation Lines. Advances lengthened the lines of repatriation. Third US Army pushed South-East into Bavaria. The rail loading-points were thrust forward to WURZBURG (O-5835), and again to MUEHNHURG (O-4200). A rail trip of five to six days from loading point to French reception centers was involved, with attendant discomforts, inadequate sanitary facilities, crowded conditions, food and water problems. Similarly, the problems of security guards, medical attendants, train crews and control personnel were more difficult. The First US Army moved into Thuringia, advancing its loading-points to ERFURT and LEIPZIG (E-2515). Later the Ninth US Army forced its way through and beyond BRAUNSCHWEIG. Ninth Army IP evacuation then proceeded along the line MUNSTER (A-9373)-LIEGE (K-5829), with trans-shipment of French repatriates to VALENCIENNES (J-0103).

43. Motor Transport Units. During advance into GERMANY military transport was required for military needs. Trucks were needed to carry IP's to rail-heads, and supplies to IP centers. The French authorities answered this problem in part by furnishing some fifty truck companies. The French companies transported approximately 40,000 persons per day. The use of these motor units was coordinated by G-5 in consultation with the French.

44. Concentration Camps. Serious problems were encountered in concentration camps.

a. The Handbook for Military Government in Germany, December 1944,¹² states as follows:

- (1) Paragraph 425, "Military Government public safety officers will be responsible for the control of the following agencies: ...d. Concentration camps--until dissolved."
- (2) Paragraph 480: "After the initial seizure of such a camp and under arrangements to be made by the military commander, an administrative group to include, whenever possible, a Military Government public safety officer and a representative of CIC will take over and supervise the administration of the camp. Guards and other necessary personnel may be drawn from troop units or from indigenous non-Nazi sources, depending on the situation."
- (3) Paragraph 482: "The Allied officer in charge will also arrange for the rapid processing of the detainees by a board under his chairmanship, composed of three or more officers, to include

a Military Government public safety officer, a member with legal experience, a member of Counter-Intelligence Branch (if possible), and a medical officer (if possible)".

b. However, the same publication, "Handbook for Military Government in Germany," SHAEF, December 1944, in Chapter VIII,¹² specified that inmates of concentration camps should be, if under restraint by the German authorities on racial, political, or religious grounds, treated as United Nations displaced persons, and in Para 710c, 711, and 727, gave directions for their care and administration.

c. The uncoordinated directions caused some confusion initially, when the first concentration camps were uncovered; however, The Commanding General, 12 Army Group, invoked the authority of Par 2 of the same Handbook¹² and directed that responsibility for concentration camps should be with DPX at all echelons. Excerpts from the Weekly Report, Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 Section, SHAEF,¹³ portray the situations found in some of the concentration camps and the efforts made to alleviate them.

d. Buchenwald--liberated 13 April 1945.

- (1) Survivors---20,000 (31 nationalities).
- (2) German ration---600 to 700 calories daily.
- (3) Daily death rate under Germans---200 (60 to 80 executed).
- (4) Average adult weight on liberation---60 to 80 pounds.
- (5) Estimated death toll, all causes, 1937-1945---54,235.

Buchenwald survivors were cared for and repatriated by a "D" type Military Government detachment. Inmates even after liberation died at the rate of 20 a day. A complete evacuation hospital was ordered to the scene in an attempt to lower this appalling death rate and to carry out a health program to a point where all inmates could stand the repatriation journey. Among the problems of the officials controlling this liberated concentration camp were the daily visits of hordes of visitors accredited and non-accredited from higher headquarters and national governments. Many cases were reported of former inmates being removed from this camp without authority, transported by private means and dying while enroute to their destinations. The provisions of paragraph 2a, Handbook for Military Government in Germany, dated 1 September 1944,¹⁴ were invoked by the Commanding General, 12 Army Group, in a TWX to Commanding Generals, First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth US Armies, dated 25 April 1945.¹⁵ Instructions were given that no individuals or agencies were to visit liberated concentration camps without the approval of army commanders.

e. Mauthausen Concentration Camp (V-9080). As reported by the French doctor, Professor Marshall, compared to Mauthausen, Buchenwald was a health resort. He states that according to reliable notes made by intellectual inmates, 183,000 persons were killed in the years 1941-1945. He describes a sample daily menu as follows: breakfast---ersatz coffee; midday---one

litre of thin soup; supper--a small slice of sausage and a small piece of black bread.

45. The YALTA Agreement.

a. An agreement between the USSR on the one hand, and the United States and Great Britain on the other, was concluded at YALTA, SSR of Crimea, 11 February 1945.¹⁶ Included in the terms of this agreement were high-level plans for the care and exchange of displaced nationals of the countries concerned. Countless numbers of Soviet displaced persons and prisoners of war had been the object of United States care almost from D-Day. In broad general terms that part of the Yalta Agreement¹⁶ pertaining to displaced persons/former prisoners of war stated that nationals of countries concerned would be humanely treated and returned to the control of the interested power as rapidly as military operations permitted. Prior to the surrender of GERMANY, exchanges of nationals were made under provisions of this Agreement. The Russian drive from the VISTULA to the ODER, in January 1945, liberated thousands of American, French, British, Belgian, Dutch, and Norwegian prisoners of war. At the same time, slave-laborers from the western European nations were uncovered in the same sectors. Collection centers were established at such places as REMBARTOW and LUBLIN, in POLAND, BREST-LITOVSK, and ODESSA in USSR. Liberated allied personnel were forwarded to ODESSA, shipped in British ships across the BLACK SEA, through the POSPHORUS and DARDANELLES, to GREECE. There certain British soldiers were disembarked to join units still in AFRICA. These vessels proceeded to MARSEILLES (T-4258) and NAPLES, where French, British, and American soldiers again came under military control and where civilians were cared for by UNRRA. Returning ships carried members of the Russian and Polish armed forces, many wearing captured German uniforms, to ODESSA to rejoin their units.

b. The YALTA Agreement substantially gave to liberated Soviet citizens the scale of maintenance and allowances normally provided for recovered Allied military personnel. Difficulties were encountered. Supply plans had not made provision for such allowances. Some of the materials called for under supplementary directives of ETOUSA under the YALTA Agreement, such as red cloth material for distinctive insignia, were not available in the Theater. But more serious than these were evidences of jealousy on the part of displaced persons who had lower scales of maintenance and fewer allowances. In effect, the YALTA Agreement had operated to create a special class of persons, whose handling accordingly became difficult.

46. Summary DP Operations in GERMANY 8 May 1945. Daily Situation Report Number 8, issued by the Displaced Persons Branch, G-5 Section, SHAEF¹⁷ shows the following condition of operations on V-E Day:

<u>ARMY GROUP</u>	<u>IN CAMPS</u>	<u>OTHERS ESTIMATED</u>
12	1,166,527	862,600
6	91,346	200,000
Total in US Zone	1,257,873	1,062,600

REPATRIATES BY NATIONALITY (Not included in the
(Prior to V-E Day) above)

	<u>12 Army Group</u>	<u>6 Army Group</u>
French	194,343	125,000
Belgians	54,375	***

Dutch	41,598	***
Luxembourgeois	1,159	***
Totals	291,475	125,000

Approximately 50,000 French and several thousand Belgians had been repatriated by air and approximately 25,000 Eastern Europeans had been brought temporarily into France and Belgium.

47. The Halle Plan. Reference has been made to arrangements between the Supreme Commander, AEF, and accredited representatives of the USSR, for the repatriation of Eastern European nationals liberated in Western Europe, and for a similar movement of US and British personnel, from the area of Russian operations. The Yalta Agreement¹⁶ planned for such repatriation on a Foreign Office-State Department level. Operational details were still to be decided. The problem of repatriating an estimated 1,500,000 Soviet citizens in the French, British, and US zones called for a working plan. Accordingly, a conference between representatives of the Soviet High Command and SCATF convened at HALLE (D-9438), GERMANY, 16 May 1945, and a plan was adopted which called for the delivery of repatriates at 11 points from ISHAR (T-4695) on the north to FLAUFEN (K-1220) near the Czechoslovakian border, and for two such exchange points in Austria. Ten such points were actually established. 1,500,000 Soviet citizens were estimated to be present in the ETO and 300,000 US, British, and Western European nationals were in the theater of Soviet operations. Under the terms of this plan, transfer of individuals proceeded by rail, motor and air. The following tables indicate the status of DP operations on 9 May 1945:

NATIONALITY BREAKDOWN OF DISPLACED PERSONS ON HAND

IN GERMANY IN 12 ARMY GROUP AS OF 9 MAY

Table I

WESTERN EUROPEANS

	<u>French</u>	<u>Belgians</u>	<u>Dutch</u>	<u>Lux'ois</u>
<u>In Camps</u>				
1 US Army	18,613	4,619	1,798	94
3 US Army	25,000	2,000	1,500	400
9 US Army	21,853	11,728	9,465	300
15 US Army	3,139	2,347	2,524	287
Subtotals	68,655	20,694	15,287	1,081
<u>Outside of Camps</u>				
1 US Army	90,000	30,000	30,000	500
3 US Army	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000
9 US Army	50,000	10,000	5,000	200
15 US Army	1,500	1,000	500	100
Subtotals	161,500	43,000	37,500	1,800
TOTALS	230,155	63,694	52,787	2,881

<u>In Camps</u>		<u>Outside of Camps</u>	
1 US Army	25,124	1 US Army	150,500
3 US Army	28,900	3 US Army	7,000
9 US Army	43,346	9 US Army	65,200
15 US Army	8,347	15 US Army	3,100
Subtotal	105,717	Subtotal	225,800

NATIONALITY BREAKDOWN OF DISPLACED PERSONS ON HAND IN GERMANY IN 12 ARMY GROUP AS OF 9 MAY

Table II

OTHER THAN WESTERN EUROPEANS

	<u>Russians</u>	<u>Poles</u>	<u>Yugoslavs</u>	<u>Czechs</u>	<u>Greeks</u>	<u>Other Allied</u>	<u>Italians</u>	<u>Bulgarians</u>	<u>Other Ex-Enemy</u>
<u>In Camps</u>									
1 US Army	52,352	15,564	1,042	1,112	191	163,653	8,349	125	33
3 US Army	40,000	18,200	800	500	400	3,200	5,900	100	100
9 US Army	280,165	116,364	4,000	3,000	250	28,862	31,962	1,000	—
15 US Army	189,640	47,490	2,607	425	155	1,438	41,695	136	—
Subtotals	562,157	197,618	8,449	5,037	996	197,153	87,906	1,361	133
<u>Outside of Camps</u>									
1 US Army	200,000	100,000	50,000	30,000	5,000	50,000	20,000	10,000	5,000
3 US Army	25,000	10,500	200	200	100	5,000	1,000	100	1,000
9 US Army	50,000	20,000	5,000	1,000	500	10,000	5,000	1,000	—
15 US Army	7,000	2,000	500	500	100	2,500	500	100	—
Subtotals	282,000	132,500	55,700	31,700	5,700	67,500	26,500	11,200	6,000
TOTALS	844,157	330,118	64,149	36,737	6,696	264,653	114,406	12,561	6,133

In Camps

1 US Army	242,421
3 US Army	69,200
9 US Army	465,603
15 US Army	283,586
Subtotal	1,060,810

Outside of Camps

1 US Army	470,000
3 US Army	43,100
9 US Army	92,500
15 US Army	13,200
Subtotal	618,800

TOTALS, TABLES I AND II

<u>In Camps</u>		<u>Outside of Camps</u>	
1 US Army	267,545	1 US Army	620,500
3 US Army	98,100	3 US Army	43,100
9 US Army	508,949	9 US Army	157,700
15 US Army	291,333	15 US Army	16,300
Subtotal	1,166,527	Subtotal	862,600

TOTAL 12 ARMY GROUP

In Camps	1,166,527
Outside of Camps	844,600
GRAND TOTAL	2,011,127

48. Post Surrender Operations. Although hostilities ceased 8 May 1945, the vast problem of transporting Eastern European displaced persons into Soviet controlled areas and the reception of British, US, and Western European nationals still remained. Situation Report Number 27, Displaced Persons Branch, SHAEF, 10 July 1945,¹⁸ summarizes displaced persons activities as follows:

CONDITION ON 10 JULY 1945

<u>ARMY GROUPS</u>	<u>IN CAMPS</u>	<u>OTHERS ESTIMATED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
12	1,083,043	37,320	1,125,368
6	117,237	-	117,237*
Total US Zone	1,205,275	37,320	1,242,595

* Does not include Seventh US Army area Eastbound Europeans in 6 and 12 Army Group Zones.

<u>IN CAMPS</u>	<u>OTHERS ESTIMATED</u>
331,381	19,950

The following comparison indicates the speed with which DP's were repatriated following VE-Day:

	<u>IN CAMPS</u>	<u>OTHERS ESTIMATED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
May 8	1,257,373	1,062,600	2,320,473
July 10	1,205,275	37,320	1,242,595
Differences rep-	52,598	1,025,280	1,077,336

rescuing repatriations
in the period.

Analysis of the figures quoted above reveal the following significant facts:

a. In the period 8 May 1945 to 10 July 1945, over 1,000,000 displaced persons were cleared from the area of US operations.

b. During the same period, over 52,000 individuals had been cleared from displaced persons camps.

c. An estimated 1,000,000 displaced persons had been collected, cared for in camps, and to a large extent had been started toward repatriation.

d. Altogether in the US Zone, some 4,200,000 displaced persons had been handled; some 2,700,000 had been repatriated by 10 July 1945; and some 550,000 had been turned over in place to British, French, and USSR forces as the latter moved into their permanent zones.¹⁹

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PART FOUR

ENEMY REFUGEES

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

49. Definition. Enemy refugees are defined as "enemy civilians within their own country, who are--

a. Temporarily homeless because of military operations;

b. At some distance from their homes because of reasons related to the war."¹

50. Responsibility. German authorities were charged with the responsibility for enemy refugees. It was intended that Allied forces would play only a supervisory role. It was necessary, however, at times for Allied forces to participate actively in operational activities.

CHAPTER 2

PRIOR PLANNING

51. The SCL/EF Outline Plan for refugees and displaced persons (all operations) was published 3 June 1944.

a. The plan provided for the control, care, and disposition of refugees and displaced persons in the SCL/EF area of responsibility, so as--

(1) To eliminate or reduce interference with military operations.

(2) To permit a smooth transfer of responsibility from military authorities to civilian agencies at the earliest practicable date.

b. It was to be a Civil Affairs/Military Government responsibility "to supervise indigenous authorities in the control of refugees".

c. Provisions were made for surrender terms which would require German authorities to issue standstill instructions to refugees and submit lists of concentration camp inmates. German authorities were to be responsible for the care of Allied displaced persons. Food and supplies were to be provided by the Germans in order to insure that rations for Allied displaced persons were at least equal in caloric value to those of German "civilians".

52. Collapse. The plan² considered the possibility of a German collapse. It was recognized that central and local government might break down. In such a case, detachments would be sent forward with escort in advance of the main body of troops to "organize and supervise indigenous authorities in the control of refugees." It was considered desirable to assist refugees in moving to their homes as soon as the military situation permitted. Military commanders were to specify routes for use by refugees in order to prevent interference with military traffic.

53. Opposed Advance.

a. Military commanders were to specify routes for use by refugees in order to prevent interference with military traffic. In the early stages and in the absence of responsible local authorities military commanders were to be prepared to direct and control refugees by utilizing combat troops.

b. In later stages, control of refugees was to be a joint responsibility of the Provost Marshal and of Civil Affairs/Military Government detachments in division and corps zones. In army zones and Com Z it was to be primarily a responsibility of Civil Affairs/Military Government. Military commanders were held responsible for posting signs for the guidance of refugees.

c. Collecting points and transit points were to be organized to facilitate the canalization of refugees' movements. Groups were to be organized at collecting points and sent rearward with military escorts if necessary. It was declared a Military Government responsibility to instruct local German authorities to set up information bureaux in each town or city where large numbers of refugees were found. Refugees moving from one zone into another would be temporarily housed and given food and medical care while enroute. Prior clearance would be obtained from the military commander into whose zone they were to be moved.

d. Provisions were made for the supply and transportation of refugees.

54. 12 Army Group Plan.

a. The prior planning of 12 Army Group for refugee operations was included in G-5 Operational Instructions Number 5, published 30 September 1944³ and Operational Instructions Number 13, published 20 April 1945.⁴

b. The plan of 12 Army Group directed that "German authorities will be directed to provide for the control and care of refugees." German authorities were, in addition, to provide for the nationals of ITALY, and other ex-enemy or co-belligerent countries who were captured in GERMANY.

c. The intention of the policy was:³

- (1) To prevent any hindrance to military operations which might be occasioned by massing or uncontrolled movement of refugees.
- (2) To prevent and control outbreaks of disease among refugees, which might threaten the health of the military forces.
- (3) To relieve, as far as practicable, conditions of destitution among refugees.

55. 6 Army Group Planning.⁵ Relief of German refugees was to be entirely a matter for German authorities and the army group commander was to insure that the German authorities provided for the maintenance, care, and disposition of enemy or ex-enemy displaced persons and refugees. Otherwise, the policy was substantially the same as that of 12 Army Group.

56. Further SHAEF Planning.

a. The publication of Administrative Memorandum Number 39, on 18 November 1944,⁶ presented a detailed plan for Allied operations with reference to refugees in Germany.

b. Specific responsibility of the German authorities toward German refugees, as well as toward enemy, ex-enemy, and co-belligerent displaced persons, were set forth. The Germans were directed:

- (1) To provide and pay for all goods, facilities, and services required.
- (2) To take all necessary measures as directed by military commanders for refugee control.
- (3) To produce, on demand, lists of these persons in internment and concentration camps, and lists of the places of confinement of political prisoners, and their locations.
- (4) To set up assembly and reception centers as directed.
- (5) To disseminate stand-fast orders as instructed by military commanders.
- (6) Where necessary, to establish accommodation facilities separate from assembly centers for United Nations displaced persons. Wherever possible refugees were to be billeted on the German population.

57. Organization of Command.

a. Military district commanders were to relieve the advancing fighting forces as quickly as possible of the "supervision, control, and administration" of refugees.

b. Military Government detachments at Regierungsbezirke were to submit weekly returns to military district headquarters, showing the numbers of refugees to be returned to their homes by public transport and the areas to which they were to be returned.

58. SHAEF Handbooks. Two SHAEF handbooks were published in December 1944; the first was the Handbook for the Military Government of Germany, Prior to Defeat or Surrender;⁷ the second was the Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Germany;⁸ both were dated December 1944. In general, those handbooks repeated the provisions of Administrative Memorandum Number 39, SHAEF.⁶

CHAPTER 3

EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM

59. Numbers of German Civilians. During the winter of 1944-45 the number of German refugees uncovered was relatively small. Many German civilians moved eastward into territory still controlled by the German army.

60. Origin of German Refugees.

a. There were two general classifications of German refugees:

- (1) Those who had been moved from their homes by German authorities to suit the convenience of the German government and
- (2) Those who had moved of their own accord.

b. The first category included German civilians who had been moved from their homes by German authorities to work in factories and other installations. Another and far larger group was evacuated from bombed-out cities. A third group consisting of officials and members of the Nazi Party was evacuated to escape the advancing Allied armies.

c. The second category included refugees who had moved after their homes had been destroyed as a result of military operations. A second group fled in the face of the advancing Allied armies.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONS WITH REFUGEES

61. Beginning of Operations. Military Government operations were begun usually within a few days after a city or village was taken. Difficulty was encountered initially in working through local German authorities as in many instances they had become refugees or, being Nazi Party members, had fled. Officials experienced difficulty, at first, in exercising authority and, as a result, orders affecting refugees were posted and enforced in many cases by Military Government personnel.

62. Travel of Refugees.

a. German refugees were at first ordered to stand fast and were allowed out of buildings for only one hour during the day. Later the time was lengthened, and they were allowed to travel within a radius of six kilometers.

b. During the month of June 1945, the travel radius was increased to 25 kilometers and road blocks were established at important points to regulate travel. At that time extensive travel began. A great deal of the travel took place in violation of stand-fast orders, with the Germans infiltrating between road blocks. Other refugees were authorized to travel by Military Government for compassionate reasons.

c. The Germans travelled in all directions except into the Russian Zone. However, two main streams of travel gradually became discernable.

- (1) One stream moved in a generally southwesterly direction from BERLIN and from other cities and villages in the zones of the Ninth and First US Armies.
- (2) Another stream moved in a southerly direction from devastated cities such as BREMEN and HAMBURG, as well as other cities and towns in the industrial Ruhr.

d. Refugee travel was unorganized and uncontrolled. This was due to an acute lack of transportation facilities. Displaced persons had priority over German refugees in the use of vehicles. The Germans moved in any type of vehicle they could find. Tens of thousands moved on foot, with their personal belongings carried on packs on their backs and in little four-wheel carts.

63. US Army Personnel Engaged in Refugee Operations. Refugee operations were a function of the public welfare officer, in Military Government detachments. There was no other US Army personnel engaged in public welfare in the large cities. In the smaller cities and towns the public welfare officer was usually responsible for public health and, in many instances, had other duties as well.

64. Refugee Welfare.

a. German refugees were adequately cared for by the German populace in small communities. In many communities school buildings were used for emergency housing, although thousands were housed in private homes. The German populace had accumulated stocks of food which in general were sufficient.

b. German Welfare Agencies. The German Red Cross and other general relief agencies had largely collapsed by the time Military Government was established. There were innumerable National Socialist Volkswohlfart, (NSV) welfare workers, however, who were conducting a sort of organized care for women and children. Military Government officers took over existing structures and continued this care working through local burgermoisters. Officials of the NSV resigned or were removed, and acceptable local organizations provided personnel to handle refugees. In Bavaria considerable use was made of the Bavarian Red Cross and a Catholic organization, The Caritas-verband. In the city of MUNICH (Y-8556) an appeal was made through the churches to the rural communities for food and clothing to care for refugees passing through that city. This appeal was highly successful.

65. Policy and Method in Handling of German Refugees. Military Government officers placed as much responsibility as possible on the German people for their own care and control. When refugees came into a town the Burgermeister was directed to provide food and shelter for them, which he generally did. Military Government officers supervised the distribution of food and medical supplies. In only a very few instances was any food supplied by American forces.

66. Attitude of Refugees. German refugees were found to be cooperative and easily managed.

67. Persecuted Refugees. A special group of German refugees, designated as "victims of nazi persecution and the Nuremberg laws", was considered as United Nations displaced persons.

68. Problems. Three main problems were evident throughout operations with German refugees.

a. A shortage of Military Government personnel, especially interpreters.

b. A shortage of transportation, which resulted from the fact that much civilian transportation had been destroyed or taken over by allied military forces, and that both army personnel and allied displaced persons had priority.

c. A lack of covered accommodations.

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PART FIVE

REPATRIATION

CHAPTER 1

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

69. General Situation.

a. The accommodation of displaced persons in camps and assembly centers in countries other than their own was at best a temporary solution. It was correctly anticipated that they would above all be desirous of returning to their own countries. With the exception of a comparatively small number (the group which came to be referred to as "the hard core"), the individuals concerned had the most compelling ties with their homelands.

b. Implicit in the early discussions with Allied nations was the consideration that the repatriation of displaced persons would be a major Allied objective.

70. Early Assumptions.

a. The view was strongly held in some quarters that there was a considerable chance of a collapse or a surrender of the Hitler government in GERMANY before Allied armies actually invaded that country. When this was taken as an assumption, the problem of repatriation appeared comparatively simple.

b. A second assumption was that Allied nationals, displaced in GERMANY, would be amenable to orders from the Supreme Allied Commander or from their own governments to "stand fast", awaiting the orderly process of repatriation. This assumption was consistently followed in all planning at SHAEF and was incorporated in the Handbook for Military Government in GERMANY, SHAEF, December 1944,¹ and in Administrative Memorandum Number 39, SHAEF, 18 November 1944.² It was omitted in the revision of 16 April 1945. More realistic appraisals, based on the conduct of displaced persons encountered in the RHINELAND, were adopted by lower echelons, even before the later revision of SHAEF Administrative Memorandum Number 39.³

c. A third assumption, based on the foregoing two, was that once collapse or surrender had been accomplished, all rail routes and all motor roads previously existing would be available for the rapid repatriation into Western nations of their displaced nationals. French and Belgian plans for reception of their displaced persons were based on this assumption, which was to prove impractical.

d. A fourth assumption made in the early stages was that it would be possible to separate recovered Allied military personnel from other displaced persons and to accord them a higher priority in repatriation. This was possible when the armies were uncovering but a few thousand displaced persons per day. When the number liberated each day rose to 50,000, 100,000 or more, it was impossible to make such a separation.

71. Transport Arrangements.

a. While a hostile GERMANY remained, it was obvious that any transport of displaced persons from areas liberated or occupied

in the European Theater of Operations would be a circuitous and laborious process, necessarily involving water transportation around SCANDANAVIA or through the MEDITERRANEAN. The same considerations, applied to repatriation of US, British and Western European nationals liberated by the Red Army.

b. It was realized while operations in FRANCE were proceeding that fighting our way into GERMANY would necessarily involve wholesale destruction of rail lines, especially at their critical points, such as tunnels and bridges. Particular attention was paid at this time to the more difficult bridges of the RHINE River. The daily train capacity of the bridges across the RHINE River was the critical and limiting factor in all repatriation.

72. Quantitative Considerations. Advisers familiar with rail operation in the US indicated that planning should be on a basis which would call for transportation of not to exceed 100,000 persons each month. During the planning stages repatriation was considered a two- to three-year task. Air transport was not heavily relied on in the formulation of plans.

73. Control.

a. It was anticipated, that executive control must be exercised at a high echelon of command, in order to insure that the repatriation proceeded in an orderly fashion. The early planning envisaged an overall "Allied Movement Control", which would be established at the highest echelon of command and would issue executive orders for movement upon certification by military commanders that specific individuals were ready to be moved.

b. The second form was considered to be security control. It involved:

- (1) Insurance that only persons entitled to cross the frontier were certified for movement out of GERMANY.
- (2) Prevention of substitution of unauthorized individuals for authorized individuals in the course of the journey to and over the frontier.
- (3) Prevention of the smuggling of documents, especially those of a security nature and those concerned with property control, as well as small objects of high value.

c. In addition to the above Allied national authorities would exercise their own controls for the normal customs and immigration controls.

CHAPTER 2

PLANNING FOR REPATRIATION

74. Supreme Headquarters Plan.

a. The plan devised by SHAEF was contained in "Handbook for Military Government in GERMANY," SHAEF, 1 September 1944.⁴ That plan was in turn based upon the "Directive for Military Government in GERMANY prior to Defeat or Surrender", CCS, 17 April 1944.⁵ (See Appendices 1 and 2.)

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b. The plan was based upon collection, concentration, and maintenance of Allied displaced persons in assembly centers until they could be repatriated in orderly fashion. Allied liaison officers were to "authorize" repatriation by issuance of repatriation visas.

c. The Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), was charged with the establishment of an organization for the rapid and orderly repatriation of displaced persons, which could be "handed over in due course to the appropriate civilian authorities."

d. Subordinate commanders were given the following repatriation mission: "supervise any repatriation movement being carried out from or into" their areas.

e. Displaced persons were to be ordered to stand fast; both Allied liaison officers and German authorities were to issue such orders.

f. Military District Commanders were to initiate requests for transportation of displaced persons based on completed registration cards. Copies of movement orders were in all cases to be furnished to the governments concerned.

g. Administrative Memorandum Number 39,² Subject: Displaced Persons and Refugees in GERMANY, SHAEF, was dated 18 November 1944, and included provisions for:

(1) Overall administrative control of repatriation by SHAEF. The technical channel of communication was authorized for communication between Displaced Persons Executive (DPX) at SHAEF and subordinate organizations. Working arrangements with Allied governments were referred to. Arrangements for repatriation were to be made through SHAEF Missions to the countries concerned, or, where there was no mission, directly with the governments concerned. Military district commanders were to arrange through appropriate channels for the repatriation of United Nations displaced persons through or out of their areas. UNRRA was "authorized" to undertake, among other duties, the repatriation of displaced persons, except enemy displaced persons. The functions, duties and status of Allied Liaison Officers for Repatriation were set forth in great detail. As to repatriation their two basic duties were:

- (a) To recommend, in conformity with instructions from their governments, priorities for the repatriation of their nationals.
- (b) To issue repatriation visas.
- (c) Repatriation movement control was described with great detail.

h. The "Handbook for Military Government in GERMANY Prior to Defeat or Surrender," SHAEF, December 1944,¹ was not in conflict with Administrative Memorandum Number 39, SHAEF,² Army group commanders were authorized to direct variance from the procedures outlined in the Handbook, in accordance with their delegated authority for Military Government.

i. An extensive revision of Administrative Memorandum Number 39, SHAEF, dated 16 April 1945,³ was issued. This revision incorporated the arrangements made at YALTA,⁶ CRIMTA, for care and eventual repatriation of liberated Soviet citizens. Revised regulations for security control were also incorporated.⁷

- (1) Military commanders were instructed to "employ all practicable means" to transport United Nations displaced persons to places agreed on, where they could be handed over to their national authorities. They were to arrange through appropriate channels for repatriation movement through or out of their area.
- (2) United Nations governmental agencies might be authorized by SHAEF to be employed (but only where self supporting) to furnish and operate the means of transport for the repatriation of their nationals. The duties of Allied liaison officers for repatriation were redefined, and the duties of chief Allied liaison officers at SHAEF were stated.
- (3) The control of unorganized movement of displaced persons was revised in the light of experience gained.
- (4) The functions of Soviet repatriation representatives were stated. Repatriation status of wives, husbands and children of displaced persons was determined. Repatriation procedures were established for persons of doubtful nationality, non-enemy displaced persons whose nationality was affected by territorial changes, and persons refusing to return to their countries or districts of nationality or former residence.

j. Assembly centers to receive displaced persons who presented themselves at the frontiers were to be established, if necessary, by evacuating German civilians from cities and towns along the frontier.

75. Plans for Border Control and Reception Stations Inside Liberated Countries.

a. Allied Governments, especially FRANCE and BELGIUM, had in accordance with SHAEF plans, prepared plans for their own border control and reception stations, within their own boundaries, prior to D-Day.

b. As of 2 January 1945, it had become apparent that a German collapse was not to be anticipated. This meant wholesale damage to railways and roads, and led to the conclusion that the mechanics of westbound repatriation would differ from those assumed in the planning stages. This fact was communicated to SHAEF by Commanding General, 12 Army Group, with a recommendation that the Allied governments be asked to revise their repatriation plans. The revision recommended was for deployment in depth of border control and reception stations, along such rail lines as were scheduled to be rehabilitated.

76. Military Railway Service. The Director of the Military Railway Service issued a general instruction in January 1945 that any

cars or Wagons which would otherwise run empty, might be used for the transport of displaced persons. This fundamental decision was of the greatest importance in solving the mechanics of repatriation, and in itself advanced the repatriation program many months ahead of schedule.

CHAPTER 3

REPATRIATION OPERATIONS

77. Narrative Account: Early Steps in Repatriation. Certain limited repatriations were made prior to the entrance of United States forces into GERMANY. These involved nationals of FRANCE, BELGIUM, and THE NETHERLANDS. The numbers were small, and no serious problems developed. Motor convoys were formed and taken to designated reception stations. Stations were located at ARLON (P-6123), BELGIUM, for citizens of BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, and at VALENCIENNES (J-0103), for French and Belgian nationals. Facilities were established at MAASTRICHT (K-5652) for nationals of THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM and FRANCE. The Belgian government transferred nationals of THE NETHERLANDS, at all times, without complaint and without difficulty.

78. First Repatriations from GERMANY.

a. During the fall of 1944, reports were received indicating movement of large numbers of displaced persons eastward out of the RHINELAND. Whereas the estimate as of D-Day had been for 640,000 displaced persons in the RHINELAND, subsequent revisions had brought this figure to 150,000 by 19 January 1945.

b. Actual experience showed this figure to be approximately correct. Of these, some 40 percent, or 60,000, were nationals of the western countries.

c. As the displaced persons were liberated, few national groups appeared as homogeneous units. It was therefore necessary to establish "sorting centers" in the rear of army zones. Initially, First US Army had such a center at VERVIERS (K-6632) and Third US Army at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8414). During February 1945, these installations were advanced into GERMANY, the First US Army at AACHEN (K-8242), and the Third US Army at TRIER (L-2129).

d. Divisions directed displaced persons to collecting points established toward the rear of divisional areas. There, the displaced persons were taken by motor transportation to the "sorting centers". On arrival, the individuals were separated by nationality, usually by being directed toward their national flags displayed in the compound. They were then billeted, fed, and dusted with DDT powder. Two difficulties were encountered at this time: the lack of interpreters and, in many cases, the uncertainty of the displaced persons themselves as to their true nationalities. The latter was especially true in the case of eastern Europeans and of former residents of LORRAINE. As national groups accumulated (an increasingly rapid process), request was made for transportation for western Europeans. Movements into FRANCE of eastern Europeans were discontinued as of 12 March 1945.

e. Western Europeans were, as far as possible, separated into their own national groups, but the exigencies of the situation required that a number of "mixed trains" be dispatched for further sorting upon arrival in rear areas. Where time permitted French, Belgians and Dutch were placed in separate cars, so that trains could be broken and dispatched to different reception centers.

f. Clearance with national governments for these movements was obtained by army groups, under weekly blanket quotas. National governments made no distinction between displaced persons groups (which contained large numbers of claimants to the status of recovered allied military personnel), and the recovered Allied military persons. Frequently large numbers of both groups arrived simultaneously at border reception stations.

g. Upon arrival at border reception stations, the displaced persons became the responsibility of the national governments concerned.

h. It is to be emphasized that the transportation employed was largely "goods wagons" (freight cars), and that loading facilities were virtually non-existent. Trains carrying displaced persons from TRIER (L-2129), for example, had to be loaded at a siding at WECKER (L-0222) near KESSELBILIG (L-1024), LUXEMBOURG, a distance of 14 miles. The sole facility at WECKER (L-0222) was a siding, and displaced persons often had to wait for trains for one to two hours in an open field during inclement weather.

79. Narrative Account: Repatriations from East of the RHINE.

a. As the United States armies advanced into GERMANY east of the RHINE, the numbers of liberated displaced persons greatly increased and the lines of communication for evacuation lengthened rapidly. The journey for displaced persons increased proportionately and problems of feeding, water, and sanitation multiplied by geometric progression.

b. The limited bridge facilities for crossing the RHINE became an important factor in repatriation operations at this time. Bridges were constructed at ESSEL (A-2341); at DUISBURG (A-3218); and at MAINZ (M-3656). A footbridge was available at MANNHEIM (M-5300) with rail facilities on both sides and limited crossing facilities were available at KARLSRUHE. The RHINE could be crossed with difficulty at STRASBOURG.

c. The "sorting centers" were advanced to the RHINE and beyond as the operation progressed, the Third US Army in the vicinity of MAINZ (M-3656), the First US Army at GIESSEN, the Ninth US Army in the vicinity of MUNSTER (A-9373), and the Seventh US Army at MANNHEIM (M-5300).

d. In spite of operational difficulties, the flow of French, Belgian and Dutch displaced persons continued. During April 1945, 140,000 westbound European displaced persons were repatriated from 12 Army Group area, and 30,000 from 6 Army Group area. The bulk of these were French; Belgians were the next largest group.

e. Displaced persons travelled for four to six days in baggage cars without heat and with the crudest of sanitary arrangements. Trains travelled short distances and halted for long periods necessarily.

f. It was discovered that displaced persons who were scheduled for westbound movement, even under such difficult conditions, were entirely content to accept them. If they were not scheduled for immediate movement westward, they began self-repatriation along the roads. Accordingly, all emphasis was placed on expediting the movement of displaced persons by whatever means possible.

80. Narrative Account: Repatriations after VE-Day.

a. The German surrender, effective 0001 hours 9 May 1945, marked a turning point in repatriations. Until this time, any repatriations accomplished were by use of surplus transport. After this date, repatriations became a principal objective, entitled to a high priority. Previous to VE-Day, combat troops could be used for care, control and repatriation of displaced persons only at the expense of the combat mission, and therefore were used sparingly. After VE-Day combat troops could be and were used freely to effect this objective.

b. During the month of April, repatriations had averaged 35,000 per week. During the month of May, they averaged almost 220,000 per week. During May, repatriations from Third US Army alone were in excess of 100,000 per week.

c. Repatriations from Third and Seventh US Armies were directly into FRANCE, in most cases trains carrying Belgian or Dutch displaced persons were separated either at LUXEMBOURG CITY (P-8414) or at METZ (U-8659), the French displaced persons going to LONGUYON (U-4596), RAVIGNY or NANCY (U-8511) and Belgian and Dutch displaced persons were routed north to or through VALENCIENNES (J-0103), bound for Liege (K-5829). Repatriations from Ninth US Army to the west were routed to LIEGE (K-5329). Civil Affairs Detachment A1F1 at LIEGE (K-5829) operated a 24-hour-a-day sorting center, in which repatriates were separated by nationality and dispatched to proper areas.

d. Fifteenth US Army having become operational, it progressively occupied the RHINELAND, although with limited troop and service facilities. Food was scarce and the continuance of displaced persons in this area would make heavy drafts on imported food, including US Army stocks. The presence of large concentrations of displaced persons also jeopardized frontier security control. Accordingly, on 12 April 1945, The Commanding General, 12 Army Group, instructed armies that no displaced persons were to be released in the area of Fifteenth US Army.

e. Another factor affecting repatriations was the appearance of typhus fever among displaced persons in GERMANY. At the request of the Typhus Control Commission, and by coordination between the Surgeon and the AC of S, G-5, 12 Army Group, a cordon sanitaire was established at the RHINE River. No persons other than US or Allied forces might be moved west of the RHINE without being dusted with DDT powder.

f. In spite of this precaution, a limited number of persons already infected with typhus made their way into FRANCE and BELGIUM. The addition of "case finding teams" under control of the surgeons at various echelons of command succeeded in tracing these cases, dusting their contacts, and accordingly controlling the spread of typhus, which did not become epidemic.

81. Machinery for Repatriation of Eastern Europeans. As a result of meetings with the Russians held at HALLÉ (D-9438), during May, a plan was adopted for the rapid repatriation of liberated Soviet citizens. Seven transfer points on the line of demarcation (later increased to nine) were established, extending from WISMAR (T-4695) on the north to PLAUEN (K-1220) on the south, together with a transfer point at LINZ (Q-8588). Each side was to transfer the maximum number possible according to capacity. Priority was to be given to the movement of US/British recovered Allied military personnel and

thereafter to western European displaced persons from Russian areas. No distinction was to be observed among liberated Soviet citizens. The Allied forces would transport liberated Soviet citizens into reception camps east of the ELBE River and would remove westbound repatriates therefrom.

82. Effect of This Plan.

a. The plan was put into effect immediately. All means of transportation available were mobilized, including airlift. Operational difficulties of airlift, made it an uncertain factor, but numerous moves from Com Z were made by air.

b. Repatriations of liberated Soviet citizens by this means from 26 May 1945 to 10 July 1945 averaged 25,000 per day.

c. Considerable numbers of liberated Soviet citizens were passed directly from AUSTRIA into Soviet hands and some Western Europeans were passed into the hands of Third US Army for repatriation to western governments.

d. While the liberated Soviet citizens were making their way eastward, a smaller but still substantial number of Western Europeans was being turned over to the Allied forces. Returning transportation carried these individuals across GERMANY, to the western nations, where they were fed into reception machinery of the western governments, which by this time was operating at a high capacity and with considerable efficiency.

83. Repatriation of Western Europeans. The greater part of the Western Europeans had been repatriated by 15 June 1945. Those remaining included those of doubtful status, such as former residents of LORRAINE, and those who did not desire to be repatriated.

84. Italian Displaced Persons.

a. Displaced persons of Italian nationality constituted a special problem. In the US Zone, there were approximately 150,000 Italians, with a much larger number in the British Zone. They were to be screened and those who had supported the Allied cause were to be treated as United Nations displaced persons. The balance were to be treated as enemy displaced persons. Lacking qualified Italian liaison officers no screening could be done. In practice, the armies tended to treat Italian displaced persons as United Nations displaced persons, segregating them in camps of their own.

b. It was felt that the best solution to the problem was to return persons of Italian nationality to ITALY, and to permit the authorities there to perform the screening. Accordingly, a conference was held at BOLZANO on 16 June 1945, at which representatives of SHAEF, army groups and armies, met with a similar delegation from Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), and plans were formulated for movement of Italian displaced persons out of GERMANY into ITALY.

c. These plans envisaged two routes: via the BRENNER Pass, and through SWITZERLAND.

d. These plans were put into effect in the last week of June 1945, and substantial repatriations of Italians were noted between 23 June 1945 and 10 July 1945, the limiting date of this study.

85. Other National Groups.

a. Other groups in GERMANY included Czechs, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Hungarians. Arrangements for repatriation of Czechs to PILSEN (L-0642) were made by Third US Army, and quotas for weekly movement were made to other armies and army groups. In excess of 110,000 Czech displaced persons were repatriated prior to 10 July 1945.

b. Repatriation of Yugoslavs was more difficult, as the country to be traversed included, alternatively, territory held by the USSR forces, or by AFHQ forces. Direct arrangements were made between elements of Third US Army and the Yugoslav authorities, for movements to LJUBLJANA, JUGOSLAVIA.

c. Repatriation of Bulgarians and Hungarians had to await the restoration of stable conditions in their own country, and the assent of the USSR forces for the necessary travel across areas held by them. Consequently, there were no repatriations of these nationalities prior to V-E day.

86. Repatriation of Poles and Baltic Peoples.

a. Poles were liberated in large numbers in GERMANY; also, former nationals of LITHUANIA, ESTHONIA, and LATVIA. The status of these individuals was not clear, with respect to repatriation.

b. In some individual cases, claims were advanced by Soviet repatriation representatives that all these individuals were to be considered liberated Soviet citizens. Such claims were not accepted by army groups or armies, and such cases as arose were referred to higher authority. Upon the publication of Administrative Memorandum Number 39, SHAEF, revised 16 April 1945,³ (op. cit.) a procedure was established for such of these persons as desired to return. However, the status of those who did not desire to return was left in doubt. Par 30 of the cited document stated:

"....Those persons, unless they have been identified as Soviet citizens by Soviet repatriation representatives, will not be returned to their countries of nationality or districts of former residence unless they have committed war crimes, trial for which requires their presence there."

Par 23c of the same document read:

"c. After identification by Soviet repatriation representatives, Soviet displaced persons will be repatriated regardless of their individual wishes."

At the close of the period, the question of whether an admitted Pole could be identified as a Soviet citizen and repatriated against his will, had not been answered.

87. Westbound Repatriations from the Soviet Zone.

a. While the Soviet displaced persons were being moved eastward, nationals of Western Europe who had been liberated by the Soviet forces were moving to the west. French, Belgian, and Dutch displaced persons who had been brought from ODESSA through AUSTRIA, were handed over to the Third US Army.

b. No distinction was made in the handling of westbound displaced persons, as between recovered allied military personnel, and displaced persons.

88. Adjustment of Zone Boundaries. While in general displaced persons were turned over in their same locations in the course of boundary adjustments, the Soviet Commander requested, just prior to the move of Soviet forces into THURINGIA, that all displaced persons except Soviet citizens be removed from the area by the US forces. Between 1 July 1945 and 7 July 1945, 140,000 individuals of non-Soviet nationality or whose status was in doubt, were removed from THURINGIA into Third and Seventh US Army areas. Because of the difficult food situation in the RUHR, the removal of Soviet displaced persons from that area was given a high priority. They were directed to centers in the vicinity of LEIPZIG (E2515) for transfer through DESSAU (E-1170), TORGAU (E-6543), and RIESSA (E-8615).

89. Repatriation of Soviet Displaced Persons from Communications Zone.

a. Until 12 March 1945, there had been some movements of eastern European displaced persons from GERMANY into FRANCE, as a measure of operational necessity. These movements had been made with the explicit understanding that they would eventually be returned to GERMANY for accommodation and eventual repatriation.

b. Russian displaced persons held in Communication Zone were given first priority in the use of airlift. Some difficulties were experienced in coordination of eastbound airlift as there was not a regulated flow to the few air fields which could accept the heavy planes. However, considerable quantities of them were returned by air.

c. As soon as announcement was made that the area of THURINGIA would pass to the Soviets on 7 July 1945, SHAEF Mission to FRANCE dispatched the balance of the Soviet displaced persons remaining in FRANCE by rail into the area of Seventh US Army.

90. Inter-zone Movement of Displaced Persons. There were numerous necessary inter-zone movements of displaced persons. These moves were a necessary preliminary to the various repatriations. For example, Italian displaced persons were moved from Seventh and Fifteenth US Armies to Third US Army, for concentration at MITTENWALD prior to shipment to ITALY. In numerous instances, westbound displaced persons were moved to the zones of other armies to participate in repatriation movements.

91. Documentation. Repatriations were accomplished with a minimum of documentation, consisting principally of Forms DP-1 and DP-2, the basic records for displaced persons.

CHAPTER 4

EVALUATION OF RESULTS OBTAINED

92. Rapidity of Repatriation.

a. The outstanding feature of the program for repatriation as actually accomplished was its rapidity. By the time that responsibility passed from army groups to HQ USFET, approximately 2,700,000 displaced persons had been repatriated from GERMANY.

b. The necessities for rapid repatriation included an anticipated shortage of foodstuffs in GERMANY, the widespread destruction of accommodations for displaced persons, and the evident unwillingness of the displaced persons to remain in GERMANY any longer than was physically necessary.

c. Repatriations prior to 10 July 1945 represented 90 per cent of the persons actually repatriable in the US Zone, GERMANY, at that time. The balance consisted of Poles, Baltic peoples, stateless persons, and representatives of nationalities for whom no repatriation was yet possible.

93. Military Railway Service. Throughout, the rapidity of repatriation depended on the Military Railway Service which moved displaced persons in any transportation which otherwise would have travelled empty. The broadest possible interpretation was placed on this regulation by the regulating stations and the railway operating units.

94. ADSEC. No responsibility devolved upon ADSEC for the moves of displaced persons. ADSEC had responsibility for the movement of recovered Allied military personnel after identification and acceptance by G-1. Some confusion resulted at reception centers in liberated countries when duplicate shipments of blanket quotas arrived from DPX and from ADSEC.

95. DPX.

a. DPX, SHAEF, exercised overall control, employing technical as well as command channels to DPX at lower echelons.

b. Plans for documentation of displaced persons in repatriation, being based on a comparatively slow rate, did not prove workable at lower echelons and repatriation was accomplished with a minimum of documentation.

96. Allied Liaison Officers. The effectiveness of the work of the Allied liaison officers for repatriation, of whom approximately 500 were deployed, can hardly be overstated. These individuals in general operated with great efficiency and individual cases of wholehearted devotion to duty were numerous. Eleven nationalities were represented among the Allied liaison officers for repatriation, and in addition many US officers of Polish, Czech, and Russian extraction who spoke the respective languages were of great assistance. Throughout, the language barrier was a notable difficulty, increasing in the lower echelons. The lack of interpreter personnel required great patience and application on the part of officers and men engaged in repatriation work.

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PART SIX

WELFARE OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

97. Welfare Problems in the WFO

a. Organized welfare work was obviously limited in its potentialities in the extreme forward areas. In liberated territories, the problem was mainly one of rehabilitating the indigenous welfare organizations, and supplying them with the available materials for relief. With the passage to national authorities of responsibilities in local government, the indigenous welfare organizations became a function of that government. Work with UNRRA was direct, rather than through military channels, and UNRRA established its own missions to the government concerned.

b. The welfare problem in GERMANY was of direct military concern. Not only did it involve problems of great destitution and economic distress of many if not most of the German population; but also the difficulties caused because German welfare organizations had become part of Nazi party instrumentality.

98. Staff Responsibility for Welfare for Civilians. At all echelons of command, during the campaigns in FRANCE, and other liberated territories, welfare for civilians was a responsibility of the G-5.

CHAPTER 2

CIVILIAN WELFARE IN LIBERATED TERRITORY

99. Planning for Welfare in Liberated Territory.

a. The American tradition for humanitarian activities was inherent in all the early planning for Civil Affairs. Two agencies were provided, in addition to the forces of Civil Affairs, for discharge of the welfare mission in liberated territory: The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, and the American Red Cross.

b. Initially, welfare officers were provided in the larger Civil Affairs detachments. In addition, welfare responsibilities devolved specifically upon Civil Affairs officers in smaller detachments. Welfare activities in the forward areas were limited to alleviations of conditions of hunger, exposure, and illness.

100. Welfare Operations in FRANCE.

a. Early in operations in FRANCE, indigenous welfare organizations came forward and offered their services. Some of these had been encouraged by the Germans, and others had been merely tolerated, presumably because they relieved official occupational authorities from the responsibility for welfare work. G-2 and CIC quickly indicated which organizations and individuals were trustworthy from a security standpoint, and army G-5 sections made local arrangements accordingly.

b. In various local situations, the Croix Rouge Francaise, the Entr'aide Francaise, and other French indigenous agencies, were entrusted with the welfare task as soon as the fighting had passed.

c. On 1 September 1944, teams of the Mission Militaire Liaison Administratif (MMLA) were attached to the US armies in the field. Their basic function was to assist in liaison between US military authorities and French indigenous charitable and welfare organizations. This they did, and with notable and unquestioned success. They became the connection through which the work of French agencies was coordinated with Civil Affairs organization. Though their scope was subsequently broadened to other fields, the feminine teams of the MMLA completely discharged this original function, and immediately took from the shoulders of the US military authorities the detail and the burden of relief.

d. The American Red Cross likewise assumed specific assignments, notably in distribution of clothing from the US. In some cases, the American Red Cross, through the field representatives of the Civilian War Relief Branch, made the distribution of clothing direct: in general, they supervised the distribution through French local agencies, e.g., the Entr'aide Francaise.

e. In October 1944, primary responsibility for local government in areas to the west of a line, roughly north and south through the RHONE Valley, passed to the French national authorities, and thereafter, civilian relief and welfare in that area was a French responsibility. This responsibility was successively extended to the German frontier, as army group rear boundaries were advanced.

101. Civilian Welfare in Other Liberated Territories. The development and functioning of civilian welfare in BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, and such parts of THE NETHERLANDS as were liberated by US forces, followed the same pattern, generally speaking, as it had in FRANCE.

CHAPTER 3

CIVILIAN WELFARE IN GERMANY

102. Nature and Extent of Problem.

a. The problem of civilian welfare in GERMANY was different from that in liberated countries. The extent of the problem was immeasurably greater, both by its volume (the number of people in need of welfare services) and by its complications (security considerations in the employment of indigenous welfare organizations).

b. German populations had been subjected to numerous forces which had created millions of refugees and these same forces created large numbers of welfare cases. Allied aerial attack had wrought destruction in most German cities and towns. Especially in such areas as the RHINELAND and the RUHR, where the fighting had been heavy and protracted, there were innumerable instances where families had lost all resources. It has been estimated that half the population of GERMANY had become nomadic as the result of refugee movements.

c. The Nazi party had without compunction turned the normal channels and organizations of welfare to party use. Discriminations abounded in which the test for the administration of welfare was not need or charity but rather party usefulness. Devices whereby

so-called "approved genetic units" had been able to obtain cumulative benefits, while others, not in favor with the Nazis, had been limited to the smallest of the available benefits. Welfare funds, though collected from local taxation, had all been sent to the German central government, and disbursed from there. The multiplications of administrative bureaus in German welfare control organizations had diffused the welfare function between three Government departments and a dozen independent or semi-independent agencies, making the task of securing control of German welfare through existing organizations complex and difficult.

d. Local welfare authorities, having been in a majority of cases active party members, were not acceptable. It was anticipated that, in some cases at least, funds would be recovered and records of welfare organizations would be available. In the few cases where records had not been dissipated, the heavily Nazi complexion of the benefits accorded by them made them worse than useless as a basis for reviving indigenous German welfare organizations.

e. Private charities were believed to be equally unreliable. The extent to which Nazi personnel and policies had penetrated the religious and other private charity organizations was not known, but was judged to be considerable. The Catholic "Caritas", it was believed, would in some measure be free of Nazi influence, but its funds were known to be limited by the operation of party policy. The semi-official charity organizations, such as the "Winterhilfe" or "Winter Help", were known to be Nazi-dominated.

103. Planning for Welfare in GERMANY.

a. The various SHAEF "Handbooks for Government in GERMANY"^{2,3} included plans for welfare operations. In general, these plans included the following provisions:

- (1) Limitation of welfare and relief programs of Military Government to those necessary to prevent disease or disorder prejudicial to tactical operation.
- (2) Permitting German authorities to carry out their own welfare programs.
- (3) To designate which welfare organizations might operate, and to denazify them.
- (4) To abolish discriminatory welfare laws and to terminate special benefits based upon party and military organization membership.
- (5) To require German welfare agencies to assist in dealing with United Nations displaced persons.
- (6) To centralize local welfare functions in the stadtkreis and landkreis, with such local sub-offices as might be necessary.

b. On 24 February 1945, the Commanding General, 12 Army Group, recommended that this plan be simplified and clarified substantially as follows:⁴

- (1) During the combat phases, and as long thereafter

as proved necessary, all welfare activities to be limited to the local level, and centralized in a single agency, a revived "Wohlfahrtsamt" or welfare office.

- (2) The Wohlfahrtsamt to be a function of the local government, under the Oberbürgermeister or Landrat.
- (3) Funds for welfare to be obtained from the Stadtkreis or Landkreis budget - thus putting financial control under Military Government supervision.
- (4) Limitation of the welfare services to need and wiping out any discrimination.

c. This recommendation was accepted and included in SHAEF Technical Manual on Welfare¹¹ and was immediately promulgated to all commands.

104. Welfare Operations in the Combat Phase.

a. In forward areas, welfare necessarily had to wait upon clearance of the area by combat elements. In general, but little welfare effort was feasible forward of division rear boundaries. As division rear boundaries advanced, and as Military Government detachments became established, displaced persons were collected and evacuated, or brought into camps. Refugees began to return to the towns and cities. Others came out of hiding and began to resume a more normal life. Generally, forward of division rear boundaries, German civilians were restricted to their houses, except for one or two hours per day in which they were permitted to obtain food. To the rear of army rear boundaries this restriction was progressively relaxed and the six-kilometre travel provision was put into effect.

b. With the establishment of Military Government detachments, Wohlfahrtsamter were revived. Such welfare as was permitted was on an emergency basis such as temporary assistance for the sick, the aged and the very young.

c. With the arrival of static conditions and after the surrender on 9 May 1945, more comprehensive programs of local welfare relief were possible. Military Government detachments, through the control of local officials, and in the case of the larger detachments, through public welfare officers organic or attached, administered welfare on a more professional basis with respect to German nationals.

d. Although the American Red Cross, Civilian War Relief, did not engage in relief work in GERMANY, field representatives with Military Government detachments in numerous instances assisted in the organization of welfare work. Thus, in AACHEN (K-8242), an American Red Cross field representative assisted the Military Government courts in cases of juvenile delinquency, by interviewing parents and reporting on home conditions which had a bearing upon the adjudication of the cases and the imposition of sentences. In numerous communities the American Red Cross assisted in organizing playgrounds for children under 12, in organizing day nurseries, and in arranging transportation and distribution of milk for infants and nursing mothers.

CHAPTER 4

AMERICAN RED CROSS--CIVILIAN WAR RELIEF

105. Terms of Reference and Operations.

a. The Civilian War Relief of American Red Cross operated under the terms of an agreement between SCAEF and the American Red Cross. This agreement specified that the American Red Cross, Civilian War Relief, would not engage in an independent operation but would assist the military in certain specific ways. Red Cross personnel and staff were to be attached to Military Government detachments. They were to possess, nominally, officer status. They were to employ military channels of communication.

b. During the campaign in FRANCE, the number of field representatives was progressively increased. During the campaign in GERMANY prior to the German surrender, there were approximately 50 field representatives of this branch of the American Red Cross with the armies.

c. In FRANCE, BELGIUM, and THE NETHERLANDS, American Red Cross supervised the distribution of relief clothing and, in some cases, actually performed the distribution. In GERMANY, the American Red Cross made distribution of relief clothing to displaced persons and assisted Military Government in the supervision and, in some cases, the organization of welfare activities (see Chapter 3).

106. Communication and Reports. Difficulty was experienced with respect to reports by American Red Cross field representatives, to supervisors at high echelons, with a carbon copy to the Military Government detachment to which the representative was attached. Thus grew up a system of "Red Cross channels" which had the effect of circumventing staff coordination at intermediate echelons.

107. Staff Control of American Red Cross, Civilian War Relief. Civilian War Relief was the only branch of the American Red Cross which did not operate under the staff supervision of AC of S, G-1. It operated under staff supervision of AC of S, G-5. At 12 Army Group, with the concurrence of AC of S, G-1, American Red Cross, Civilian War Relief, wrote its own orders, furnishing a copy to the adjutant general.

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PART SEVEN

THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

IN CONNECTION WITH REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

CHAPTER 1

PLANNING

108. Outline Plan.¹

a. In planning for the control, care and disposition of refugees and displaced persons, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was scheduled to take a very important part.

b. It was estimated that there were 11,332,700 refugees and displaced persons in BELGIUM, DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY (excluding German refugees), LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, and NORWAY. Of these, indications were that 2,397,300 were refugees within their own countries, and that 8,935,400 were displaced persons in foreign countries, speaking at least 20 different languages, and being the concern of as many governments. It was recognized that their care and disposition presented not only technical and administrative problems of great magnitude, but complex political problems as well. Actual operations later uncovered at least 47 different nationalities.

c. The "Outline Plan" took cognizance of several variable factors, and drew the following conclusions: The number of refugees would vary considerably, depending on the date, character, and duration of military operations. If the Germans opposed the advance, the uncovering of appreciable numbers of displaced persons in the area in which operations might be undertaken was not expected to take place in the early stages. Following upon the heels of collapse or surrender, the problem of displaced persons was likely to assume vast proportions, within a matter of days. The partial or complete breakdown of central and local government authority in GERMANY was a possible eventuality. It was assumed that steadfast orders would not be effective in the event of German collapse or surrender if Allied military personnel were not present to organize and supervise indigenous authorities. It was necessary to take steps to assure a continuous flow of food and supplies to Allied nationals in concentration camps, and concentrated industrial groups. Problems of feeding, housing, medical attention and quarantine would arise, varying in accordance with the extent of devastation in particular areas.

d. The plans of Allied governments to expedite repatriation processes, the SCAEF plan, and the UNRRA policies are based on the following underlying principles:

"That repatriation of Allied displaced nationals shall be effected at the earliest possible time.

"That, as far as possible, provision must be made for their general well-being while awaiting repatriation.

"That adequate measures be taken to prevent the spread of dangerous epidemic diseases.

"That the machinery set up to give effect to these principles will be international in character, and will place maximum

responsibility and control in the hands of Allied national authorities at the earliest practicable date."

e. Agreements or working arrangements were to be negotiated by SCAEF with Allied European authorities other than the USSR to secure the establishment of a procedure whereby UNRRA and foreign voluntary relief societies might assist in dealing with displaced persons in particular areas, or countries.

f. "Responsibility for the care and relief of refugees and displaced persons in military areas, or in parts of these areas, in which an Allied national authority does not exercise administrative authority, may be delegated to UNRRA at a time and to an extent to be determined by SCAEF.¹ In liberated territory in which an Allied national authority exercises administrative authority, UNRRA will assume similar responsibility when so requested by the national authority concerned."

g. An agreement was to be negotiated by SCAEF with UNRRA to accomplish the following:

"UNRRA to agree to assist SCAEF during the military period if so requested.

"Determination of conditions under which assistance will be rendered by UNRRA."

h. The Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees was to continue its responsibility for persons who had been obliged to leave their homes for reasons of race, religion or political belief and could not or did not desire to be repatriated.

109. UNRRA Assembly Center Teams.

a. Military teams administering assembly centers for United Nations displaced persons would be replaced by more permanent UNRRA teams as they became available and conditions permitted.²⁻³

b. Working arrangements had been agreed upon with the United and Associated Nations and UNRRA was authorized to undertake the care, relief, and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons. It was necessary, however, that UNRRA be specifically invited by the government concerned before it could operate in any country.

c. In GERMANY, UNRRA was to assist military authorities in their work with United Nations displaced persons, but was not authorized under its charter⁴ to undertake the care and disposition of enemy displaced persons or refugees found in GERMANY, except stateless persons and persons persecuted because of race, religion or activities in favor of the United Nations. Concerning the latter, UNRRA undertook to care for those who could not or did not desire to be returned to their homes, for a period of time to be agreed upon between UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee.

d. UNRRA staff personnel was to be attached to appropriate headquarters, and UNRRA was to provide assembly center teams, including medical, welfare and administrative personnel, as requested by military commanders. The proportion of UNRRA personnel at all levels was to be increased as rapidly as military and other considerations permitted, in order to facilitate the smooth transfer of responsibility to UNRRA when appropriate.

e. UNRRA was to coordinate the activities of all United

Nations voluntary societies engaged in displaced persons work in GERMANY.

f. UNRRA was mobilizing 450 Assembly Center teams during the period 1 April to 30 July 1945. It was estimated that the peak load of displaced persons would require the establishment of a minimum of 1500 assembly centers. This, it was pointed out, would require the continued use of military teams until such time as the number of displaced persons involved was reduced to such an extent that the number of centers required did not exceed the number of UNRRA teams available.

CHAPTER 2

OPERATIONS

110. The calling forward of UNRRA staff personnel and spearhead teams. Following the agreement of 25 November 1944⁵ between SHAEF and UNRRA, staff personnel of the latter were gradually taken into the various military echelons concerned. As late as 1 March 1945 UNRRA teams were not available to fill the requests made by the 6 and 12 Army Groups. About 20 spearhead teams (7 or 8 people) were made available during March, and were divided between the armies of both army groups. A phasing schedule was then put into effect which would produce approximately 70 spearhead teams by 20 April 1945 for the two U.S. Army Groups. The 6 U.S. Army Group considered that the above program would supply it with a sufficient number of UNRRA teams and notified SHAEF to this effect. The 12 Army Group informed SHAEF that it would need more. (See Appendix 6.)

111. Situation regarding vehicles and personnel. There was a lack of lift to get vehicles and personnel for UNRRA from the United Kingdom to the Continent. An additional hindrance was the fact that the vehicles available were condemned British vehicles reconditioned at the UNRRA Center at GRAVILLÉ, FRANCE. These vehicles gave poor service and could not be readily repaired if they broke down after leaving GRAVILLÉ.

112. Situation from end of May 1945 to 10 July 1945. By the end of May the armies found themselves with approximately 150 spearhead teams and did not desire any more.

113. Relations of UNRRA with United Nations voluntary relief agencies. SHAEF Memorandum, No. 39 (revised), Section II, Paragraph 12 h,² provided that UNRRA was the agent of the Supreme Commander for the coordination of the activities of all United Nations voluntary societies engaged in displaced persons work in GERMANY. On the basis of this authority and in accordance with the terms of Appendix G, 7 May 1945, Administrative Memorandum No. 39 SHAEF, (revised),² UNRRA proceeded to pave the way for the use of a number of such relief societies. The procedure was for the organization desiring to work in GERMANY to communicate with the European Regional Office of UNRRA which would work out with the organization a proposal for the use of its services. These proposals were then submitted by UNRRA to the Supreme Commander, AEF, setting forth the following:

"a. Name of the organization.

"b. Type of activities in which the organization desires to engage.

"c. Official approval of the government concerned that it approves of the organization operating in GERMANY.

"d. Written proposal for the use of the organization's services as agreed between UNRRA and the organization.

"e. Numbers and qualifications of personnel involved and personal and organizational equipment available."2

114. Procedure on Approval. If the Supreme Commander, AEF, approved the agreement, he was to notify army groups of the availability of the personnel and army groups would call them forward. While agreements were made with many organizations (see Appendix 3), the only ones approved prior to 10 July 1945, were those with the French Red Cross, the American Joint Distribution Committee, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Belgian Red Cross, the Polish Red Cross, and the International Red Cross. These societies had workers in the US field of operations prior to 10 July 1945. For further detailed assistance in studying the work of UNRRA with voluntary relief societies, see Appendix 4 containing a typical agreement with accompanying letters; Appendix 3, portraying a chart showing the status of such agreements on particular dates; and Appendix 5, giving an UNRRA report entitled, "Relations with Voluntary Agencies."

115. Recruitment from MMLA. By April 1945 arrangements had been concluded whereby UNRRA began to recruit individual members of the French Mission Militaire Liaison Administratif.

CHAPTER 3

EVALUATION

116. The planning concerning UNRRA was accomplished with the object in view of having that organization, as soon as the military conditions would permit, undertake the responsibility for the liberation, care, and repatriation of United Nations displaced persons. During the period covered by this study the taking over of this responsibility was not realized to the extent which was undoubtedly desired by SHAEP. The lack of adequate lift from the United Kingdom to the Continent of Europe figured prominently in the fact that expectations were not reached. Possibly connected with this was the shortage of equipment, especially transportation. Lack of proper knowledge of the German language has been mentioned as a drawback, lack of personnel who were specialists, and unfamiliarity with the organization of the military establishment with which it had to work on such close terms. If the peak efficiency of UNRRA work had been reached earlier it no doubt would have obviated the necessity for some of the provisional Military Government units that the armies found it necessary to furnish from combat troops. (See Appendix 6.)

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3. Directive on "Control of Displaced Persons", forwarded under cover letter, SPAEF, AG 381-1 GE-AGM, 28 December 1944.
4. Charter of UNRRA.
5. Agreement between the SPAEF and the Director-General, UNRRA, 25 November 1944, is given in appendix "C" of Administrative Memorandum No. 39, SPAEF, Sub: "Displaced Persons and Refugees in Germany", revised, 16 April 1945.

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PART EIGHT

RECOVERED ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL IN RELATION
TO DISPLACED PERSONS

CHAPTER 1

PLANNING

117. Definition. Recovered Allied military personnel (RAMP) were defined as individuals formerly in the armed services of allied nations, taken prisoner by the enemy and liberated by our forces.

118. Responsibility.

a. Throughout SHAEF planning, RAMP were made the responsibility of the AC of S, G-1.

b. Displaced persons were, as has been noted, the responsibility of the AC of S, G-5.

119. Identification and Acceptance.

a. Implicit in the SHAEF planning was the assumption that RAMP would be easily identified as such. It was likewise assumed that most of such personnel would be found in prisoner of war camps and would be amenable to stand-fast orders.

b. Provision was accordingly made that RAMP discovered in camps or homogeneous groups would be immediately taken up by the AC of S, G-1 and RWX; such few as appeared singly or in small groups would be originally treated as United Nations displaced persons, and upon identification and acceptance of their claims to prisoner of war status, they would be transferred to the responsibility of AC of S, G-1.

c. Similar provision was made for US/British civilian internees and other assimilates of RAMP status.

120. Maintenance. RAMP and assimilates were to be provided with the military ration (approximately 3600 calories a day), and with full allowances, such as post exchange supplies, clothing, etc. Displaced persons were provided food on a scale of 2000 calories a day with no post exchange allowances with clothing issued on a relief basis through such agencies as the American Red Cross.

121. Evacuation.

a. Upon notification of the presence of RAMP, ADSEC would evacuate RAMP directly to their homelands.

b. Plans for reception of RAMP in their homelands had not been clarified at the time the Allied armies entered GERMANY. When RAMP began to be discovered in large numbers, the decision of the national governments was that they should be sent to the same reception centers as were currently being employed for displaced persons.

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CHAPTER 2

OPERATIONS

122. Liberated Territories. No difficulty was experienced with RAMP in relation to displaced persons in liberated territories. The numbers recovered were small and largely of the nations in which recovery had been made. Some Russians who were claimants to RAMP status were uncovered in FRANCE; there being no Russian Allied Liaison Officers for repatriation available at this time, these individuals were treated as United Nations displaced persons pending the establishment of machinery for their identification and acceptance as RAMP.

123. Early Operations in Germany.

a. While the numbers being uncovered remained small, there was no particular difficulty in operating under the plans described in paragraph 122. Up until the middle of March 1945, the system worked well. Thereafter, large numbers of individuals were uncovered daily. The number of RAMP and displaced persons soared to 100,000 per day and more. On the largest day recorded in mid-April 1945, over 400,000 individuals were uncovered on a single day within 12 Army Group.

b. It is obvious that such large numbers made orderly screening, acceptance, and identification impossible, unless repatriation of both groups was to be considerably delayed.

c. Another complication was introduced by the fact that, while there were comparatively large numbers of claimants to RAMP allowances and treatment while in camps, the number who claimed RAMP status for repatriation continued small, among the displaced persons. The one common characteristic of all the individuals, regardless of class, was their overwhelming desire to return home as quickly as possible.

124. Practical Solutions.

a. Because the decision on identification had been quite properly left to AC of S, G-1, and the RWX organization, the ability of that organization to identify and screen individuals established the rate at which this was done. Those who could not be so screened and identified were put into priority for repatriation as displaced persons.

b. The practical results of this procedure were:

- (1) In practice, camps and homogeneous groups were taken over by AC of S, G-1, immediately.
- (2) The greater bulk of those who were claimants to prisoner of war status were repatriated as displaced persons.

c. There was a continual flow of requests from SHAEF Missions that no displaced persons be repatriated until RAMP had been given highest priority, along with former political prisoners. These requests could not be complied with. The difficulty of screening, and of making physical separations of the large numbers being encountered would, in the judgment of the army group commanders, have delayed the repatriations to a point where displaced persons remaining in GERMANY during the winter of 1945-1946 would have created a serious

problem. Accordingly, repatriation of displaced persons, including claimants to prisoner of war status, was given first priority after the repatriation of identified RAMP groups. Strict adherence to this decision resulted in the repatriation of all RAMP and displaced persons from the western nations in rapid order. By mid-June 1945, all but a handful of the French and Belgian displaced persons and RAMP had been repatriated, and by 10 June 1945, the larger part of the liberated Soviet citizens had likewise been repatriated.

125. Liberated Soviet Citizens.

a. By the YALTA Agreement previously referred to, special status was given to liberated Soviet citizens. In effect they were all to be provided with scales of maintenance and allowances equivalent to those for RAMP. Those remaining in camps were to be under Soviet discipline, with internal management of the camps arranged by Soviet repatriation representatives. The latter were provided and attached to army groups. Originally, Soviet repatriation representatives were provided for both G-1 and G-5 Sections.

b. In 12 Army Group it was soon discovered that G-1 and G-5 Sections were performing identification functions for identical persons at the same time and places. Accordingly, a staff study was prepared which led to the conclusion that all responsibility for liberated Soviet citizens should be vested in AC of S, G-5. All Soviet repatriation representatives were then transferred to G-5 Sections and all responsibility for liberated Soviet citizens was vested in that section.

c. During the period from 23 May 1945 to 10 July 1945, approximately 1,500,000 liberated Soviet citizens were repatriated to Russian custody.

126. Evaluation.

a. The enormous numbers of individuals recovered in a short time during the rapid movement of Allied troops into GERMANY made screening and identification of individuals a time-consuming and laborious process, which could only be carried on at a limited rate with the personnel provided. Individuals learning of the better scales provided for RAMP desired to achieve that status and were dissatisfied with their treatment as displaced persons. Repatriation of RAMP other than those in homogeneous groups in high priority was not feasible unless repatriation were to be substantially delayed. Maintenance on differing scales proved difficult of accomplishment and complicated the problem prior to repatriation.

b. Insistence on rapid repatriation as the primary objective furnished common ground for coordination by the G-5 and G-1 Sections. Practical solutions were achieved and large numbers of both groups were repatriated.

c. Special provisions for liberated Soviet citizens were difficult of accomplishment. A clear definition of the responsibilities of the respective staff sections for liberated Soviet citizens was achieved at army groups and in armies. As with other personnel in these categories, the best solution to the problem of such persons in GERMANY was their return to their homelands.

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PART NINE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER 1

CONCLUSIONS

IT IS CONCLUDED THAT:

127. The problem of personnel dislocated by the war encountered in the ETO had no parallel in previous military history.

128. The extensive political and humanitarian implications of the problem concerned many departments of the government.

129. It was correctly concluded that responsibility for such persons must primarily be military during the military phase of operations.

130. Advance intelligence was necessarily meager and unreliable in that slave labor and prisoners of war were rapidly moved from place to place.

131. Plans made for Civil Affairs operations with displaced persons and refugees in liberated territory were adequate and effective.

132. Authorities in liberated countries were able early to assume responsibility for refugees and soon afterwards for displaced persons.

133. Throughout the operations, the shortage of individuals who spoke the many languages involved in the 47 nationalities was a disadvantage.

134. Operations in FRANCE and BELGIUM provided useful experience in the light of the much larger problem encountered in GERMANY.

135. There was little or no planning for refugee activities in the retirement in the ARDENNES but application of military principles provided an emergency solution which was satisfactory.

136. The return of refugees after reliberation of the ARDENNES region was successful.

137. Adequate medical and nursing care were necessary in all displaced persons and refugee movements.

138. Planning for displaced persons operations in GERMANY was detailed and thorough, its principal lack being an appreciation of the large numbers which would be encountered in a short time under conditions of rapid advance.

139. Personnel shortage hampered operation until after VE-Day.

140. The stand-fast policy, which assumed that displaced persons would accept orders to remain where they were, was unsuccessful.

141. The planning for border reception centers in FRANCE was originally established on the assumption of an early German surrender and had to be hurriedly revised when such was found not to be the case.

142. Former slave laborers exhibited a "liberation complex", on account of which their conduct posed a grave problem of public safety.

143. Plans for displaced persons centers were in general inadequate in the light of conditions encountered and personnel available.

144. There were contrary instructions in directives for handling of liberated concentration camps.

145. The YALTA agreement¹ operated to create a special class of liberated citizens (Soviet) whose handling proved to be exceedingly difficult.

146. The establishment of special conditions for liberated Soviet citizens caused jealousy and difficulty with nationals of other nations.

147. The imposition of responsibility for enemy refugees upon the enemy authorities was successful except that Military Government had to exercise the authority initially owing to the absence or political unsuitability of German authorities uncovered by the advance.

148. The avoidance of epidemic conditions among displaced persons and refugees was a major public health achievement and was successful.

149. The theory that the German national government would collapse or surrender early in the period of operations made planning deceptively easy and was not justified by the fact.

150. Stand-fast instructions and travel instructions were successful in controlling the movement of German refugees and were relaxed progressively at the earliest possible moment.

151. German refugees proved to be cooperative and tractable.

152. German nationals persecuted by their own government were properly considered to be United Nations displaced persons.

153. Planning for repatriation envisaged a less rapid operation than proved to be practicable.

154. It was correctly anticipated that executive control of repatriation must be exercised at a high echelon of command.

155. Clearance with national governments for repatriation of displaced persons was successful; however, machinery for

clearance by the national authorities for return of R&P had not been provided and this caused confusion at national reception centers in FRANCE and BELGIUM.

156. The basic decision by the Director of the Military Railway Service that any equipment that would otherwise run empty might be used for the transport of displaced persons was a major factor in the successful repatriation operation.

157. Repatriation was essentially a mass operation and did not lend itself to priorities for special classes demanded by national governments.

158. Repatriations became a principal objective with a high priority after VE-Day, and had this not been done, large numbers of displaced persons would have remained in GERMANY for the winter of 1945-46, becoming a major problem.

159. It was feasible to repatriate limited numbers of "very important persons" by special means, but when the numbers became larger it was not possible to do so.

160. No responsibility devolved upon ADSEC for the moves of displaced persons.

161. Welfare work for civilians in liberated territories was properly and successfully made the responsibility of national authorities at an early date.

162. Welfare activities in GERMANY were necessarily limited until after VE-Day; existing welfare organizations had been extensively used as instruments of party policy and therefore could not be employed. The decision to make welfare, subject only to a means test, a responsibility of the German local authorities and budget was sound.

163. The American Red Cross--Civilian War Relief-- was of assistance in the operation particularly along the lines of welfare and clothing distribution; but the establishment of separate channels of communication for Red Cross reports was unsound.

164. UNRRA planning was sound insofar as it went; but UNRRA teams and vehicles lacked sufficient shipping priorities to place them at the service of the army groups and armies in quantity when the need arose.

165. UNRRA staff representatives were properly placed at army group and army levels.

166. The service of such UNRRA teams as arrived in forward areas prior to VE-Day was in the main effective, although the number was small as compared with that planned, as a result of the condition mentioned in Par 164. Also as a result of that condition, the few teams which were sent forward in this period were reduced in strength and had limited and unsatisfactory transportation.

167. UNRRA was of increasing assistance to the armies following VE-Day, but had not advanced to a point where it could take complete responsibility by the limiting date of this study.

168. The coordination of the efforts of other United Nations voluntary relief organizations by UNRRA was laborious and did not result in the provision of appreciable assistance during the operational period.

169. There was a division of responsibility between G-1 and G-5 sections, RAMP being a G-1 responsibility and displaced persons being a G-5 responsibility.

170. Stand-fast orders were not uniformly successful with respect to RAMP.

171. The machinery for identification and acceptance of RAMP from among the displaced persons could not work rapidly enough in the light of the large numbers of displaced persons encountered; and to avoid delay in repatriation, large numbers of RAMP were repatriated as displaced persons.

172. National governments after experience concluded that they could make no distinction between RAMP and displaced persons.

CHAPTER 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:

173. Responsibility for care and control, and repatriation of personnel dislocated by the war, continue to be a military responsibility during the military phase of operations.

174. Responsibility in liberated or friendly territories be passed at the earliest possible moment to indigenous civil authorities.

175. In any such operation, emphasis be placed on the securing of an ample number of interpreters.

176. Plans for refugee activities in a retirement be made on an equal priority with plans for displaced persons activities in an advance.

177. Provision be made for adequate nursing and medical care in all displaced persons and refugee movements.

178. Future plans be made to guard against underestimates of the personnel involved, especially in refugee operations, and against an assumption of too-early enemy surrender.

179. Trained military or civilian personnel for displaced persons and refugee activities be provided in ample numbers with ample equipment.

180. The creation of special classes of displaced persons, so far as treatment and maintenance while awaiting repatriation is concerned, be avoided.

181. Predication of plans on stand-fast policy for refugees be avoided, and allowance be made for "liberation complex" in the case of displaced persons.

182. Specific provision be made for high enough priority in allocation of accommodations to make possible the provision of ample facilities for care of displaced persons.

183. Any plans involving liberation of concentration camps should specify a single authority and make available to it ample personnel (including medical personnel) and equipment.

184. In any future operation, responsibility for enemy refugees should be imposed on enemy authorities, insofar as is possible, with provision for exercise of the necessary authority in case of the absence or unsuitability of authorities found.

185. In a similar operation, that enemy nationals persecuted by their own governments be initially regarded as Allied displaced persons, for a limited period extending beyond the end of hostilities.

186. The policy by which displaced persons can be moved in any equipment which would otherwise run empty, be continued.

187. The establishment of priorities for special classes in repatriation be avoided.

188. Evacuation of all classes of civilian personnel dislocated by the war be made the responsibility of a single agency.

189. Welfare work for civilians continue to be made the responsibility of national authorities in liberated territories at the earliest possible date; and welfare activities for enemy civilians be made a specific responsibility of the local governmental authorities in occupied territories.

190. The services of the American Red Cross - (Civilian War Relief) continue to be available in any similar operation, but under supervision of the AC of S, G-1, as is the case with other divisions of the American Red Cross; and there be neither independent Red Cross channels of communication nor independent operation in the field.

191. In the case of an organization such as UNRRA, it be given high enough priorities in shipping to insure its being in the field when the need arises.

192. The coordination of the efforts of other voluntary agencies be simplified.

193. A single staff agency be made responsible for all classes of personnel dislocated by the war, including displaced persons, refugees, civilian internees, and RIMP; all such persons of Allied nationality be maintained on the same scale and with the same allowances; and responsibility toward enemy nationalities be discharged to the maximum extent possible through enemy local authorities.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

18 November 1944

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM :

NUMBER 39)

DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES IN GERMANY

E X T R A C T

* * * *

17. REPATRIATION MOVEMENT CONTROL. DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, will administer and supervise repatriation movement.

a. Prior to activation of Inter-Allied Movement Control Authority.

- (1) When military commanders wish to initiate repatriation movement of displaced United Nations nationals, who can be returned to their countries of origin without interference with military operations, such movement will be coordinated by DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, acting through the Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission accredited to the country of reception of the displaced persons. Direct communication between Army Group or Military Districts, Communications Zone, and Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Missions is authorized.
- (2) Arrangements have been made with the governments concerned to permit repatriation movement of their nationals to designated Reception Centers in France, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands at a specified daily rate to each Reception Center without necessity of prior notification for each move. Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Missions will notify military commanders concerned as soon as possible of the numbers which can be so received at designated Reception Centers, and of temporary bottlenecks as they arise.
- (3) When it is necessary to repatriate numbers in excess of these daily totals military commanders will request Missions to obtain prior specific authorization from the Allied government and from other military commanders concerned.
- (4) Displaced persons will not be moved across international frontiers to Allied countries other than their countries of origin except where operational necessity makes it mandatory or when they are in transit to their countries of origin.

- (5) In emergencies, movement of United Nations displaced persons to their claimed countries of origin may be effected without registration or the issue of visas. In such cases adequate notice will be given to Reception Centers and Supreme Headquarters, JEF, Mission concerned in order that arrangements may be made for initial processing at Reception Centers.

Authority. b. After activation of Inter-Allied Movement Control

- (1) DPX, Supreme Headquarters, JEF, will be notified by means of the Assembly Center Weekly Report forms (OL/d4 - revised) of United Nations displaced persons awaiting repatriation at Assembly Centers.
- (2) The Supreme Headquarters, JEF, Mission or government concerned will keep DPX, Supreme Headquarters, JEF, informed as to Reception Center locations in Allied countries and intake capacities.
- (3) DPX, Supreme Headquarters, JEF, will:
 - (a) Coordinate movements from Assembly Centers with Reception Center capacities and, in consultation with Movement and Transportation/Transportation Corps, will arrange onward movement. United Nations displaced persons will normally be sent to the nearest Reception Center in their own country able to receive them.
 - (b) After consultation with Transportation authorities, issue movement orders to DPX at Military District Headquarters for groups of nationals at specific Assembly Centers. In all cases, copies of these orders will be sent to the Supreme Headquarters, JEF, Mission or government concerned, for necessary preparatory action at the Reception Centers indicated.
- (4) On receipt of a DPX, Supreme Headquarters, JEF, movement order, DPX Staff at Military District Headquarters will:
 - (a) Issue appropriate instructions to Assembly Centers concerned.
 - (b) Arrange for parties from the Assembly Centers to reach their respective transport assembly points.
- (5) Assembly Center Directors will make up groups on the basis of the movement orders transmitted by Military District Commanders.
- (6) On departure of a group, Assembly Center Directors will:

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- (a) Submit a return to DPX, Supreme Headquarters, JEF, showing the names, registration numbers, nationality and destination of United Nations displaced persons who have been dispatched each day.
- (b) Furnish group leaders nominal rolls by nationality, registration number and destination of members of the group, to insure transit and frontier clearance during the journey.
- (c) Furnish each nationality group leader original JEF DP Registration Record cards (DF. 2) of all persons of the appropriate nationality making up the group, for delivery to Directors of the Reception Centers concerned.

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APPENDIX NO 1
No of Pages 3

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER

39)

(Revised - 16 April 1945)

DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES IN GERMANY

E X T R A C T

* * * *

20. CONTROL OF MOVEMENT.

a. The unorganized movement of displaced persons will be controlled:

- (1) At geographical barriers, where a system of canalization will be put into force.
- (2) At frontiers or prohibited frontier zones, which will be established in accordance with letter, this headquarters, AG 014.1-1 (Germany) GBI-AGM, subject "Directive for Military Government of Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender", dated 8 March 1945.

b. Displaced persons who arrive at control lines without proper movement authorization will, after they have been examined by Counter-Intelligence personnel, be directed back to the nearest Assembly Centers for processing and eventual repatriation.

c. Military commanders will establish sufficient Assembly Centers near such control lines to deal with the anticipated flow of displaced persons.

d. Displaced persons who are being repatriated in organized convoys under the authorization of DPX are not subject to the provisions of Administrative Memorandum No. 47, this headquarters (Revised).

21. REPATRIATION. DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, will administer and supervise repatriation movement.

a. Prior to activation of Inter-Allied Movement Control Authority.

- (1) When military commanders wish to initiate repatriation movement of displaced United Nations nationals who can be returned to their countries of nationality or former residence without interference with military operations, such movement will be coordinated by DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, acting through the Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission accredited to the country of reception of the displaced persons or, where there is no Mission, through the government concerned. Direct communication between Army Groups or Military Districts, Communications Zone, and Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Missions is authorized.

- (2) Arrangements have been made with the governments concerned to permit repatriation movement of their nationals to designated Reception Centers in France, Luxembourg, Belgium and The Netherlands at a specified daily rate to each Reception Center without necessity of prior notification for each move. Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Missions will notify military commanders concerned weekly or more often as required of the numbers which can be so received at designated Reception Centers, and of temporary bottlenecks as they arise. Any of these nationals may be dispatched initially to Reception Centers in any of these countries. However, direct repatriation should be effected whenever possible.
- (3) When it is necessary to repatriate numbers in excess of these daily totals military commanders will request Missions to obtain prior specific authorization from the Allied government and from other military commanders concerned.
- (4) Displaced persons will not, prior to repatriation, and except as indicated in paragraph 21a(2) above, be moved across international frontiers to Allied countries other than their countries of nationality or former residence, except where operational necessity makes it mandatory. If so moved, they will be cared for as a direct military commitment, subject to any arrangements for assistance which may be effected with Allied countries, and removed from Allied countries by military commanders as soon as operations permit.
- (5) In operational emergencies and prior to the cessation of hostilities, movement of United Nations displaced persons to their claimed countries of nationality or former residence may be effected without registration or the issue of visas. In such cases adequate notice will be given to the Reception Center and the Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission concerned in order that arrangements may be made for initial processing at Reception Centers.

b. After activation of Inter-Allied Movement Control Authority.

- (1) DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, will be notified by means of the Assembly Center Weekly Report forms (CA/d4 - revised) of United Nations displaced persons awaiting repatriation at Assembly Centers.
- (2) The Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission or government concerned will keep DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, informed as to locations and intake capacities of Reception Centers in Allied countries.

- (3) DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, will:
- (a) Coordinate movements from Assembly Centers with Reception Center capacities and, in consultation with Movement and Transportation/Transportation Corps, will arrange repatriation movement. United Nations displaced persons will normally be sent to the nearest Reception Center in their own country able to receive them.
 - (b) After consultation with Transportation authorities, issue movement orders to DFX at Military District Headquarters for groups of nationals at specific Assembly Centers who are to be moved across international frontiers. In all cases, copies of these orders will be sent to the Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission or government concerned, for necessary preparatory action at the Reception Centers indicated.
- (4) On receipt of a DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, movement order, DFX Staff at Military District Headquarters will:
- (a) Issue appropriate instructions to Assembly Centers concerned.
 - (b) Arrange for parties from the Assembly Centers to move to their respective transport assembly points.
- (5) Assembly Center Directors will make up groups on the basis of the movement orders transmitted by Military District Commanders.
- (6) On departure of a group, Assembly Center Directors will:
- (a) Submit a nominal roll to DFX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, showing the names, registration numbers, nationality and destination of United Nations displaced persons who have been dispatched each day.
 - (b) Furnish group leaders nominal rolls in duplicate by nationality, registration number and destination of members of the group, to insure transit and frontier clearance during the journey, one copy to be deposited with G-2/Intelligence frontier control authorities.
 - (c) Furnish the officer in charge of the convoy or each nationality group leader original AEF DP Registration Record cards (DP.2) of all persons of the appropriate nationality making up the group, for delivery to Directors of the Reception Centers concerned.

VOLUNTARY AGENCY AGREEMENTS WITH UNRRA

Name of Agency	Proposals Sub- mitted to UNRRA (final draft)	Recommended to SHAEF or CDPX	Approved SHAEF or CDPX	Agency Notified	Army Commanders Notified	UNRRA Liaison Officers Notified	Services Requested
1. French Red Cross	29 Apr 45	4 May 45	9 May 45	12 May 45	US 7th Army, 6 Aug 45 US 3rd Army, 6 Aug 45 21 A G, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug 45	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 16 Aug 45 London, 10 Aug 45	
2. American Joint Distribution Committee	7 May 45	10 May 45	5 June 45	7 June 45	US 7th Army, 6 Aug 45 US 3rd Army, 6 Aug 45 21 A G, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug 45	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 16 Aug 45 London, 10 Aug 45	
3. National Catho- lic Welfare Conference	13 May 45	15 May 45	16 May 45	17 May 45	US 7th Army, 6 Aug 45 US 3rd Army, 6 Aug 45 21 A G, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug 45	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 London, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 16 Aug 45	
3.(a) " " (supplementary proposal)	22 May 45						
4. Belgian Red Cross	17 May 45	20 May 45	22 May 45	27 May 45	US 7th Army, 6 Aug 45 US 3rd " " " " 21 A G, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug 45	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 London, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 16 Aug 45	

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Name of Agency	Proposals Submitted to UNHRA (final draft)	Recommended to SHAHEP or CIPX	Approved Agency SHAHEP or CIPX	Army Commanders Notified	UNHRA Liaison Officers Notified	Services Requested
5. Polish Red Cross	27 May 45	28 May 45	30 May 45 14 June 45	US 7th Army, 6 Aug 45 US 3rd " " " " " " " " 21 A.G., 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug 45	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 London, 10 Aug 45 Fr. Zone, 16 Aug 45	
6. International Red Cross	29 May 45	31 May 45	5 June 45 12 June 45	US 7th Army, 6 Aug 45 US 3rd " " " " " " " " 21 A.G., 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug. 45	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 London, 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 16 Aug 45	
7. Netherlands Red Cross	14 July 45	21 July 45	23 July 45 23 July 45	US 7th Army, 6 Aug 45 US 3rd " " " " " " " " 21 A.G., 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug 45	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 London, 10 Aug 45 Fr. Zone, 16 Aug 45	(US 7th Army, 27 Sep 45)
8. International YMCA	27 July 45	8 Aug 45	9 Aug 45 9 Aug 45	21 A.G., 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 18 Aug 45 US 7th Army, 23 Aug 45 US 3rd " " " " " " " "	US Zone, 9 Aug 45 Br Zone, 10 Aug 45 London 10 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 16 Aug 45	(US 3rd Army 12 Sep 45)
9. American Friends Service Committee	10 July 45	9 Aug 45	18 Aug 45 18 Aug 45	US 7th Army, 23 Aug 45 US 3rd " " " " " " " " 21 A.G., 27 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 30 Aug 45	US Zone, 23 Aug 45 Br. Zone, 27 Aug 45 Fr. Zone, 27 Aug 45 London, 5 Sep 45	

Name of Agency	Proposals Submitted to UNRRA (final draft)	Recommended to SHAEF or CDPX	Approved SHAEF or CDPX	Agency Notified	Army Commanders Notified	UNRRA Liaison Officers Notified	Services Requested
10. Jewish Agency for Palestine	28 July 45	8 Aug 45	19 Aug 45	23 Aug 45	US 7th Army, 23 Aug 45 US 3rd Army, 23 Aug 45 21 Army Gp, 27 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 30 Aug 45	US Zone, 23 Aug 45 Br Zone, 27 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 27 Aug 45 London, 5 Sept 45	(US 3rd Army, 12 Sept 45)
11. American Polish War Relief	10 July 45	20 Aug 45	21 Aug 45	23 Aug 45	US 7th Army, 23 Aug 45 US 3rd Army, 23 Aug 45 21 Army Gp, 27 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 30 Aug 45	US Zone, 23 Aug 45 Br Zone, 27 Aug 45 Fr Zone, 27 Aug 45 London, 5 Sept 45	
12. Italian Red Cross	18 Aug 45	27 Aug 45	4 Sept 45	5 Sept 45	US 7th Army, 12 Sept 45 US 3rd Army, 12 Sept 45 21 Army Gp, 11 Sept 45 Fr Zone, 14 Sept 45	London, 5 Sept 45 US Zone, 11 Sept 45 Br Zone, 11 Sept 45 Fr Zone, 14 Sept 45	Fr Zone, 20 Oct 45. Br Zone, 20 Nov 45.
13. Don Suisse	28 Sept 45			22 Oct 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45	London & Wash, 2 Nov 45 US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45	

Name of Agency	Proposals Submitted to UNRRA (final draft)	Agency Notified	Army Commanders Notified	UNRRA Liaison Officers Notified	Services Requested
14. Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad	2 Oct 45	6 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45 London, 14 Nov 45 (cable)	

Name of Agency	Proposals Submitted to UNRRA (final Draft)	Agency Notified	Army Commanders Notified	UNRRA Liaison Officers Notified	Services Requested
15. Refugee Relief Committee	24 Oct 45	6 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45 London, 14 Nov 45 (cable)	
16. Greek Red Cross	12 Nov 45	23 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45 London, 14 Nov 45 (cable to US from London)	
17. World OIT Union	16 Nov 45				
18. British Red Cross	7 Nov 45	15 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45	US Zone, 23 Nov 45 Br Zone, 28 Nov 45	

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division
Displaced Persons Branch

SHAEF/G-5/IP

12 June 1945

SUBJECT: Work with Displaced Persons in Germany

TO : International Red Cross Committee, APO 887, US Army.

1. For your information please find enclosed copy of the letter received by us from Brigadier General S. R. Mickelsen, Chief, Displaced Persons Branch, G-5, Supreme Headquarters, AEF.

2. This letter officially accepts the UNRRA recommendation to approve the plan of operation proposed by the International Red Cross Committee for work in Germany with displaced persons.

3. You will notice that in addition to the two principal projects, the distribution of food parcels and the International Tracing Bureau, Supreme Hqrs, AEF will be pleased to consider further projects as agreed upon between the International Red Cross Committee and UNRRA.

J. A. Edmison
Chief UNRRA Liaison Officer

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APPENDIX NO 4
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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division
Displaced Persons Branch

SHAEF/G-5/DP/2725

5 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Application of the International Red Cross Committee
to work with Displaced Persons in Germany

TO : Chief UNRRA Liaison Officer, SHAEF Main.

1. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated 31 May 1945, with attached documents, recommending the use of the International Red Cross for work with displaced persons in Germany under the coordination of UNRRA.

2. Your recommendation is hereby accepted and the application of the International Red Cross approved, subject to the terms set forth by this Headquarters in Administrative Memorandum No. 39, Appendix G.

3. In addition to the two principal outlined International Red Cross projects (a) distribution of food parcels, (b) International Tracing Bureau, this Headquarters will be pleased to consider any further projects of the International Red Cross recommended by you.

4. We will inform military commanders concerning such personnel as UNRRA advises us are available for calling forward and will ask that requisitions for such personnel be submitted to this Headquarters.

S. R. Mickelsen
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, Displaced Persons Branch

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-5 Division
Displaced Persons Branch

SHAEF/G-5/DP

31 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Request of the International Red Cross Committee
to work with Displaced Persons in Germany.

TO : Executive, Displaced Persons Branch

1. The International Red Cross Committee with Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, has presented through its Chief Delegate in France - Mr. J. P. Pradervand - a memorandum to UNRRA requesting authorization to work in Germany in accordance with Appendix G of Administrative Memorandum No. 39 (revised).

2. This agency is at the present time engaged in several projects dealing with the care and repatriation of displaced persons in Germany.

3. The International Red Cross Committee through its relationship with the Red Cross societies of the various liberated countries constitutes an important resource of personnel and supplies for service to displaced persons.

4. UNRRA is desirous of developing with the International Red Cross Committee opportunities for service under the terms of Appendix G, Administrative Memorandum No. 39 (revised).

5. UNRRA recommends that the International Red Cross Committee be authorized to continue under Appendix G the two principal projects mentioned in its memorandum, i.e.

a. Distribution of food parcels

b. International Tracing Bureau

and to work with UNRRA in the development of new projects in behalf of displaced persons in Germany.

J. A. EDMISON
Chief UNRRA Liaison Officer
G-5, SHAEF

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INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
DELEGATION

APO 887
US Army

Charles F. Ernst, Esq.
UNRRA, G-5
SHAFF (Main)
APO 757
US Army

29/5/45

Dear Mr. Ernst,

I enclose herewith two copies of the proposals covering the work of the International Red Cross Committee with UNRRA for displaced families.

I do hope that arrangements will be concluded satisfactorily and speedily. I personally am at your entire disposal, should you wish to call upon me, for the solution of this difficulty, in order that we may jointly try to solve the tragic and far greater problems now apparent in Germany.

Yours sincerely,

J. P. Pradervand (s)
Chief Delegate in France

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APPENDIX NO 4
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PROPOSALS FOR COLLABORATION BETWEEN UNRRA AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE IN FAVOR OF DISPLACED PERSONS.

Based on this Memorandum the International Red Cross Committee would be grateful to UNRRA for the presentation of a request to SHAEF for authorization to put its various services at the disposal of displaced persons in Germany, in accordance with Appendix G (revised), of 7th May, 1945.

I. The IRCC was called upon to work for displaced persons before the Armistice and it sent food parcels into civilian camps (as well as to those for prisoners of war). This undertaking is still continuing at the request, made since the Armistice, of the Allied Military authorities, and will so continue, with the authorization of SHAEF, as long as stocks remain to be distributed by the IRCC.

II. In 1943 the Consultative Assembly of UNRRA called upon the collaboration of the IRCC for displaced families. The Committee, who answered the appeal affirmatively, is now ready to work.

The plans foreseen by the IRCC, the putting into practical effect of which will be studied with UNRRA, are the following:

- (a) The uniting by means of notification and enquiry cards (No. P10,027) of dispersed families. This term comprises: "Inquirer and Inquiree being away from their usual residence, unable to return there unaided, in different countries and in doubt as to each other's whereabouts."
- (b) The distribution and collection of the cards which are now being printed in Geneva.
- (c) The IRCC will assist in solving correspondence problems of those displaced persons who are not repatriable, but who do not fall within category "a".

M. Thudichum, a member of the Direction of the Central Agency for Prisoners of War of the International Red Cross Committee, is now in Paris, specially to define exactly and to organize the work which UNRRA desires the IRCC to do in answer to the appeal made to the latter by the Director General, Mr. Herbert Lehmann. It is most desirable that Mr. Thudichum has the necessary contacts without delay.

It is difficult to determine precisely the number of IRCC personnel who will work permanently or temporarily in favor of displaced persons. The number depends largely upon the arrangements made between UNRRA and the IRCC.

The International Red Cross Committee emphasises its wish for close collaboration with all these relief societies whose aims are similar and in particular with UNRRA, for the greatest benefit of these unhappy victims of war.

RELATIONS WITH VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

30 July 1945

AGREEMENTS RECOMMENDED BY UNRRA
AND APPROVED BY SELECT G. CDIX

1. Agreements have been recommended and approved for the following seven agencies (see attached table for dates):

- (1) French Red Cross
- (2) American Joint Distribution Committee
- (3) National Catholic Welfare Conference
- (4) Belgian Red Cross
- (5) Polish Red Cross
- (6) International Red Cross
- (7) Netherlands Red Cross

2. The names of these agencies have been numbered in the chronological order in which the final drafts of their proposals were submitted to UNRRA for official action.

3. In addition to the above seven agreements, the National Catholic Welfare Conference has submitted a supplementary proposal for a different kind of assistance (supplementary relief supplies) which was not included in the original agreement, and which has not yet been officially recommended by UNRRA to CDIX.

4. All of these agencies, with the exception of the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the Netherlands Red Cross, now have personnel in the field. Requests for assistance from the National Catholic Welfare Conference in one of the districts of the American Zone, and for the Netherlands Red Cross in the French Zone are anticipated in the near future.

Personnel in the Field

5. Four of these seven agencies were providing services in Germany for displaced persons and doing other work as well in advance of their agreements with UNRRA under the terms of Administrative Memorandum No. 39 (revised), Appendix G.

6. Because the field personnel were often out of touch with their agency headquarters, and because of the difficulty of communications, the military reorganizations and the changes in occupation zones in recent weeks, there is as yet no complete central record of the field personnel and current services of these four agencies. Many of the people concerned were working in Germany without regular attachment orders.

7. Every effort is now being made to overtake this situation as rapidly as possible.

8. The difficulties encountered by the French Red Cross will illustrate the problem. This agency had something over 1,000 personnel in the field. Its headquarters submitted nominal rolls divided into team units to UNRRA for purposes of regularization under the new agreement. The military unit under which they were working was known in some cases. The geographical location was indicated in others, but the present military command was unknown.

In some instances no exact information was available. These lists were checked at this Headquarters to determine their location in military units. Then the process began of checking with the military headquarters concerned. At 12th Army Group Headquarters there appeared to be almost a 50% discrepancy between the names on record there and the lists submitted by the French Red Cross. Moreover the team units had frequently been altered. It became apparent also that some of the personnel were in activities other than displaced persons work - prisoners of war, military hospitals, etc.

9. Finally, the approval of this Headquarters was requested and given for a thirty-day visit of a French Red Cross administrative officer to the 21 Army Group, 3rd and 7th US Armies, and 1st French Army to consult with the appropriate military and UNRRA officers, visit the field personnel, determine what continuing or new services are desired in the area concerned, attend to internal staff problems, arrange for withdrawal of redundant personnel or services and the proper attachments and records for those who will remain. Concurrence in this request has already been received from 21 Army Group and 3rd US Army, and French Red Cross officers have been called forward to those areas. When this survey has been completed, UNRRA will confer with this agency on future program plans and requirements for administrative personnel.

10. Although the numbers of personnel involved are much smaller and the difficulties vary in detail, similar problems are presented for the Belgian, Polish and International Red Cross Societies. Since the needs in field operations have changed and are changing substantially, it is considered preferable not to rush attachment orders through until more adequate information is available than has been obtainable hitherto.

11. The following are estimates of voluntary agency personnel already in the field, en route, or likely to be called forward within the next few days:

French Red Cross	1,000 (plus)
American Joint Distribution Committee	25 (some en route)
National Catholic Welfare Conference	3 (request anticipated)
Belgian Red Cross	150
Polish Red Cross	16 (American and French Zones only)
International Red Cross	25
Netherlands Red Cross	12
	<hr/> 1,231

Note: 1. It is anticipated that a number of French Red Cross workers may be withdrawn in the course of the present survey.

Note: 2. International Red Cross personnel in the majority of cases are delegates who were in Germany throughout the war on prisoner of war work and are continuing those official duties as well as other activities on behalf of displaced persons.

Note: 3. In the 21 Army Group area the Polish Red Cross are

recruiting and organizing their personnel from among DPs and IDPs. Colonel Miziak, the chief delegate for Germany, is permitted to move freely in the area on this work on the authority of a letter signed by the senior UNRRA Liaison Officer, 21 Army Group, and stamped by Civil Affairs staff headquarters. Since the personnel of the Polish Red Cross for that Zone are now being recruited and organized, their numbers are not yet known. The UNRRA/IRC agreement approved by SHAEF provided for the recruitment of most of the IRC personnel from among DPs and IDPs. The question of the extent to which this policy can be implemented in the American Zone at the present time is now being discussed with UNRRA headquarters at Wiesbaden prior to discussion with military headquarters.

Voluntary Agency Services

12. The following is a brief summary of the services proposed by each agency with whom agreements have been recommended by UNRRA and approved by SHAEF or COMAX:

13. French Red Cross. Medical and first aid care, assistance in reception, processing, distribution of food, clothing and other supplies in assembly centers, railway centers and other points where help is needed, provision of usual Red Cross services to displaced persons or others as requested by military authorities, and any other special services as requested. As a rule, services are provided by organized teams, but individual persons may be deployed as required for special or emergency services.

14. American Joint Distribution Committee. Experienced and highly qualified personnel in welfare, health and camp administration and immigration specialists to assist Jewish and other displaced persons, and in particular, stateless persons. Personnel will have thorough understanding of the cultural backgrounds of these people and speak their language. Particularly interested in assisting large numbers of Jewish and stateless persons liberated from concentration camps; to give special attention to children, women and ill or infirm people who may require special health and welfare services; to assist in formulating plans for temporary asylum and collect pertinent data affecting plans for ultimate settlement, and to assist in interpreting to UNRRA and to the military authorities the special needs of Jewish stateless groups and, on the other hand, to interpret official views and plans to these displaced persons. This agency has had thirty years experience in dealing with such problems and commands well qualified specialist personnel for services to Jewish refugees and stateless persons.

15. National Catholic Welfare Conference. With the aid of a few well qualified and experienced officers with a varied experience in responsible social welfare posts, and wartime experience in services to prisoners of war, and with the aid also of substantial stockpiles already on this continent of spiritual, recreational, educational and occupational materials originally intended for prisoners of war, this agency proposes to furnish supplies and assist in establishing morale programs for displaced persons of all nationalities, also stateless persons and liberated prisoners of war pending final arrangements for repatriation or resettlement. Will function with a small number of well qualified workers - four to begin with - to see that supplies go to areas where they are needed as requested by UNRRA and/or military officers. Person-

not to spend only a short time in camps in anticipation that displaced persons activity leaders will be able to operate their own programs. All materials except those of a spiritual nature are intended for the community use of all displaced persons. For the past two years this agency has been doing similar work for Polish refugees in Iran, Egypt, Palestine, India, East Africa and Mexico. The agency's supplies include carpentry, leather work, wood carving and a variety of other handicraft sets; also English, Polish and Italian literature. One carload, due to a mistaken order, is now en route from Switzerland to Frankfurt and will be warehoused temporarily by International Red Cross for the NCRC.

16. Belgian Red Cross. First aid and medical care, ambulance service, assistance in the distribution of supplies and in setting up and operating rest-stop facilities. Services to be rendered generally by organized teams consisting of leader and deputy, doctor, nurse, drivers, first-aid attendants, welfare assistant, secretary and cook. All members certified in their respective fields and experienced in aid to civilians during German occupation, and in aiding victims of bombing and other violence of war. Chief emphasis in personnel and program on medical care and first aid. Early teams served in Buchenwald and other areas where large numbers of Belgians were found. Personnel also available for individual deployment as required.

17. Polish Red Cross. Assistance in medical care, first aid, reception and processing, operation of Polish Tracing Bureau, distribution of food, clothing and other needed supplies in assembly centers, railway stations or other points where such help is needed, provision of usual Red Cross services to displaced persons or other groups if requested. Services to be given generally by organized teams, or by deployment of individual persons as required. Proposes to recruit 100 teams consisting of leader, driver, cook, doctor, 3 nurses, 5 welfare assistants (1200 persons) to be recruited principally from displaced persons and prisoners of war. Agency has location of 166 doctors, 150 nurses, qualified dentists, chemists and other officers. Has available a small amount of medical supplies, used clothing and other items, 2 ambulances, 3 mobile canteens, 10 trucks. Also receives assistance in transport from Polish Army. Agency has received supplies from American Polish Relief Committee, British sources and various other sources. Agency statement indicates that considerable assistance will be required to clothe, equip and provide transport for its personnel if the contemplated plan is carried out, but some alternative sources may provide part of this, including resources designated for ex-prisoners of war. The extent to which the plan can be developed will depend not only upon the services officially requested, but also on the possibility of assistance with clothing, equipment and transport from UNRRA and/or military sources. Col. Miziak states that considerable help along these lines is being given in the 21 Army Group area.

18. International Red Cross. International tracing and message services, and distribution of food parcels which remain in stock (now 176,000) outside the pool which is being distributed through military channels. These parcels are available in specified quantity for persons of various nationalities, in accordance with the wishes of donors of these various parcels. The plan for actual distribution of tracing cards in assembly centers as foreseen by IRC cannot be carried out, and modified proposals will be negotiated after the military directive governing such matters has been issued. In July IRC representatives came to Frankfurt to advance

proposals for additional services. Their data on resources was insufficient for negotiations and two members returned to Switzerland to obtain a clearer statement of the services and material resources which might be offered. They recently returned with revised proposals for services which could be provided if requested, including medical units and supplies, TB services, possibility of convalescent care for selected persons in Switzerland, and material assistance which could be provided through UNRRA for special groups including Jews and Balts which have been designated by various donors. In view of the keen interest anticipated in the medical projects particularly, concurrence is being requested from the several zones of occupation for a brief visit by a medical representative of IRC to consult with the medical officers and ascertain what medical services and supplies are desired. The IRC delegations in Germany have been in receipt of many requests from individual military commanders and UNRRA officers whom they have encountered, for medical and other supplies, and numerous appeals have also been carried by travelers to Switzerland. The agency has already met many such requests but desires its services to be coordinated and requests properly channelled.

19. Netherlands Red Cross. Ambulance services to evacuate sick and invalided Netherlands nationals (some trips already made in recent weeks at military request), spiritual services to Netherlands nationals and supplementary material assistance where required, such as reading material, hospital comforts and clothing. Assistance to Netherlands liaison officers, if so requested, in tracing Netherlands nationals and political prisoners left behind in hospitals, prisons, etc., and collection of information regarding those who are missing, deceased or murdered, or unable or unwilling to return home. The N.R.C. has in readiness 6 fully equipped teams with transport, each consisting of information officer, protestant and catholic chaplains, 2 drivers and one dispatch rider. Estimated number of Netherlands nationals departed is stated by the agency to be 400,000 of whom 250,000 have returned and 50,000 others accounted for, leaving another 100,000 to be found or traced as still to be repatriated (e.g. from Russian Zone) or as sick or deceased. Agency has information on 250 hospital cases who are felt to be in need of moral and religious welfare. There is strong popular pressure in Holland for this Red Cross service and considerable criticism of officials because such a service was not extended earlier in Germany.

Negotiations Proceeding

20. Negotiations or discussions are proceeding with a number of agencies, and preliminary discussions have taken place or are anticipated with others. In practice, each agency is encouraged to keep its proposals in draft form, for discussion only, until there seems to be reasonable assurance that they may prove acceptable both to the military authorities and to UNRRA, and that their services are likely to be requested, in some areas at least, within a reasonable time.

21. These discussions are also exploratory from several points of view:

- (a) to discover whether there is a basis or justification for an agreement.
- (b) to obtain assurance that the agency is properly sponsored, has the ability and resources at its command and sufficiently accessible to carry out the program

proposed and that the mechanics of transport and supply, organization, etc. are feasible in the light of present conditions. This frequently necessitates consultation with other UNRRA and/or military officers and national liaison officers.

- (c) To reconcile the agency's ideas of the services and methods it would like to put into operation and its almost inevitable desire to set up a complete administrative field organization through every level, with the actual needs in the field and the administrative limitations which must be imposed at the present time. This sometimes requires considerable time.
- (d) To determine what assistance the agency may require to put its plan into operation.
- (e) If there is no basis for a standard agreement, to explore possible alternatives which may help to meet the agency's desires and sometimes the popular or official pressure within its own country which may have prompted its application.
- (f) Conditions must also be worked out in initial and supplementary agreements which will come within the agency's own established policy and which will bring satisfaction and credit to its contributors and sponsors. This will be a continuing factor also in follow-up relations with the agency. On the other hand, an agency from a distant country might be put readily in a position to exploit the terms of its agreement for the purposes of a large financial appeal which may not be wholly justified. For such reasons, agreements and proposals should be subject to periodical review, modification, or reinterpretation to weed out redundant services or plans and evolve new opportunities for services adapted to changing requirements. Close relations between this department and the field will be necessary to maintain constructive relationships with the voluntary agencies, to keep agreements up to date, to keep headquarters fully informed of evaluations of services in the field and to assist the agencies themselves by adequate reporting of their services and programs in field bulletins and by facilitating the transmission of their own field reports through UNRRA/Military channels.
- (g) In all of the above there is an important public relations aspect. Each agency representative who reaches Frankfurt has been put to a lot of trouble and inconvenience, has travelled a considerable distance and has given a great deal of time to his mission. Yet he sometimes arrives without proper credentials, movement orders or data on which to base negotiations. Motives of different kinds are bound up in their applications, but whatever they are, the motives are compelling and give rise to intense feeling and an understandable sense of urgency.
- (h) Unless another office is established to deal with many other miscellaneous requests, this department will be in receipt of an increasing number of applications or requests which will be more in the nature of representa-

tions on behalf of special groups (possibly bound up with an offer of some limited service), than of the type of voluntary agency program contemplated under Appendix G. A message just received from Ligar may be a forerunner. It communicates the desire of a "Mennonite Central Committee" to send a representative from London to Frankfurt to assist displaced persons and discuss with USFET assistance to Mennonite refugees originally of Dutch extraction who have been residents of Russia but now wish to migrate to Canada via Holland. Organizations and groups in many parts of the world are expressing their desire to aid some group in Germany without clear distinctions in their minds on such technical points as "displaced persons", "refugees", etc. In due course there will probably have to be considerable sorting out of requests between the displaced persons operation and the welfare operations of the allied control commissions.

22. With the above considerations in mind, it is apparent that discussions or negotiations with an agency may be extended over a considerable period, or may be held in suspended animation for some time pending further preparation of the agency's case or consultation with UNRRA field officers and military commands and will not necessarily lead to an official proposal under Appendix G, or imply the probable acceptance of an official proposal if it is made. The officer conducting such discussions must be careful to refrain from exercising personal influence to deter an agency from submitting an official proposal. On the other hand, most agencies will prefer to have the opportunity to modify their position or perhaps even refrain from making a formal application when fully informed of conditions or requirements for which they are unprepared. It is imperative that an agency should not be treated summarily if its proposals seem inappropriate or if it cannot meet the conditions required. There is always the chance that its proposals may be more appropriate than they appear to be from the ivory tower, and that ways and means can be found to meet the conditions. In some cases a little time and effort may succeed in linking up its services with those of another agency in the field. If it is conceded that competent voluntary agencies have a leavening philosophic contribution to offer, as well as supplementary or specialist services of material value, as they have in their home communities and countries, it will be essential to explore their potential contributions with care and to treat their offers of assistance with consideration and respect.

23. For these reasons there is likely to be for some time an imposing list of agencies stated to be under negotiation or discussion which may give the impression that a veritable horde of agencies is about to enter Germany. Even the list of those approved may later give a false impression of numbers, for some services have been, and will be, transitory, while others will continue and develop. Some programs will be service programs, while others will be mainly concerned with supplementary supplies, coordinated through UNRRA channels and distributed through UNRRA or other voluntary agency services.

24. Of the agencies now in the course of negotiation with UNRRA, four have reached an advanced stage: The American Polish Relief Committee and American Friends Service Committee, both of whom have submitted their final proposals for official action; the International YMCA/ YWCA (a joint agreement), whose revised pro-

posals are expected within the next few days; and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, whose revised proposals have been submitted for official action following preliminary negotiations with UNRRA in London and a visit of its representative to Germany. This agency is already active in field operations with UNRRA in the Balkans. Further consultations will be necessary before an official recommendation is submitted in respect to this agency, but unofficial consultations already held in respect to proposed programs of the other three agencies named would seem to indicate that their services and material assistance will be welcomed. A supplementary proposal of the National Catholic Welfare Conference is also ready for official consideration. The following is a brief summary of the programs proposed by these four agencies and the supplementary proposal of the National Catholic Welfare Conference:

25. American Polish Relief Committee. Officially recognized coordinating agency for all Polish war relief appeals in the United States. Has been spending \$2,000,000 annually on Polish relief in different parts of the world and furnished substantial supplies to Polish Red Cross. Offers large stocks of used clothing collected in national appeal, vitamins, special foods, medical supplies, soap, etc. and a certain amount of motor transport. Can arrange transatlantic shipment. Proposals and mechanical details cleared with UNRRA supply officer, Mr. Brokenshire and Colonel Bailey. Warehousing and continental transport to be arranged through agencies as required. Only field personnel will be a few officers attached to main and forward depots.

26. American Friends Service Committee. Offers for immediate service in American Zone one team of six well qualified and experienced workers for welfare and special services in recreation, self-help projects, public health (nurse) information services, administration, etc. Available for work as team or detached duty. The group commands many languages including the Slavic tongues. Would be suitable to assist in camp needing intensive welfare services. Members have had extensive experience in similar work in Middle East and on this continent. This agency would be interested in establishing one or more small convalescent or rehabilitation homes later if requested, along the lines of successful previous experience, for victims of Nazi persecution, including enemy or ex-enemy nationals and with special attention to those who are potential community leaders; interested to assist stateless people, children, and others who may need special care. Personnel will assist with tracing or correspondence services later if requested.

27. International YMCA/YWCA. Will probably offer an extensive program of recreational services, personnel, equipment and supplies for consideration at a future date, and an intermediate program which could be put into immediate operation. This would provide a small number of recreation specialists for deployment at area level for services to a number of camps as required. Personnel qualified in YMCA-YWCA activity and spiritual programs building group initiative and leadership, also experienced in services to prisoners of war and men on active service. Offers recreational supplies and equipment on this continent released from use for prisoners of war and military forces; also literature including Polish literature and educational materials, and theatrical equipment and supplies. Transport and warehousing arrangements cleared with UNRRA supply officer. These are world organizations embracing national YMCA's and YWCA's. The Polish YMCA which has been working with the Polish forces throughout the war will be an active constituent.

28. Jewish Agency for Palestine. Offers 15-20 welfare and medical personnel with special experience in Jewish welfare and rehabilitation programs. Also educational and leadership services for youth and children. Equipment includes ambulances and other transport in Palestine, if transshipment can be arranged. Personnel desires to live in displaced persons camps and share their hardships without special privileges. Representative believes shipping space can be arranged from Palestine westward. The necessity for such transport and the possibility of shipment from Palestine will require consideration. In an earlier communication this agency had asked whether transport in Palestine could be traded to UNRRA for similar equipment here.

29. National Catholic Welfare Conference. Supplementary proposal is a supply program. Items similar to those of American Polish Relief Committee. Details cleared with UNRRA supply officer. Transport, warehousing and distribution to be arranged through UNRRA channels.

30. Negotiations have been initiated but are less advanced than in the cases cited above, with the Don Suisse and a joint committee of Jewish societies in the United Kingdom, those proposals are as follows:

31. Don Suisse. One specific agreement has already been concluded by UNRRA European Regional Office and this agency, not for operations in Germany but for the reception in Switzerland of up to 2,000 children in need of temporary asylum. As a result, several hundred children and a few parents are now in Switzerland and the way is open for reception of further numbers as required, provided they come within categories acceptable to the Swiss authorities. In the course of negotiations on the above, proposals for services which might be furnished by this agency in Germany were also discussed. A definite proposal has now been submitted under date of 23 July 1945. Proposals include the arrangements described above for temporary care of up to 2,000 children for six months in Switzerland, assistance by this agency when requested, in recommending Swiss candidates for UNRRA personnel to UNRRA recruiting officers, provision of three medical teams, each composed of 2 doctors, 2 nurses and 2 welfare workers - 18 persons in all - for field work in Germany, and the establishment of a supply dump in Southern Germany for distribution within the UNRRA program of such items as clothing, shoes, sewing and knitting materials, medicines, school supplies and special foods consisting mainly of dairy products.

32. Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad (UK). The European Regional Office of UNRRA has received applications from a number of Jewish agencies which wish to offer services to displaced persons in Germany, including the World Jewish Congress. The ERO has suggested that they should join together in one coordinating body before offering formal proposals and the organizations concerned have been attempting to find a basis of agreement through the Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad. In the meantime, consideration of a formal application already submitted to the World Jewish Congress (European Division) has been suspended pending further information on the results of these negotiations. The Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad is already operating in the 21 Army Group under coordination of the British Red Cross Society, but has as yet no relationship with UNRRA. Proposals, if submitted, will probably be similar in principle to those of the American Joint Distribution Committee.

Discussions Held or Anticipated.

33. Italian Red Cross. Has intimated its desire to provide services to Italian Nationals similar to those of other Red Cross Societies. Request endorsed by Allied Military authorities in Italy. Concurrence given here for visit of one representative properly sponsored, to visit Frankfurt for purpose of negotiating an agreement.

34. Jugoslav Red Cross. Discussion held two months ago at Versailles. Services proposed would depend entirely on recruiting personnel from displaced persons and assistance with equipment and transport from UNRRA and/or military sources. No supply resources evident. It appeared one primary desire was to facilitate visit to Yugoslav D's by small semi-official mission. It was suggested this should be arranged through the Chief National Liaison Officer. Arrangements along these lines have been made and it is not known at present whether there will be any further application to UNRRA.

35. Icelandic Red Cross. A fully sponsored representative arrived in Frankfurt who desired to find 100 persons of Icelandic nationality in Germany believed to have been caught by the outbreak of war. They would not necessarily fall into the technical category of displaced persons. Red Cross representative was empowered to render any necessary financial or other assistance to care for them or facilitate repatriation. With Colonel Laraviciini's assistance and mutual consent of the Icelandic Red Cross and the Liaison Officers for Denmark and Norway, arrangements were made for this agency to receive the assistance of these liaison officers. Assistance was also given by the Tracing Bureau in preparation and classification of lists and institution of any necessary tracing operations. It was also suggested that Icelandic representative might arrange with other Red Cross societies already active in Germany to render material assistance if needed, to be reimbursed to them by Icelandic Red Cross. The above arrangements appear to have been concluded with satisfaction to all concerned. The Icelandic Red Cross representative will accompany Danish or Norwegian Liaison Officers on one or two visits projected to areas where Icelanders have been located, and will return home shortly. It may be advisable to confirm these arrangements in an exchange of letters between this agency and UNRRA, but it will not be an agreement for services to be rendered in Germany in the usual sense of this term.

36. Other Societies. Information has been received in some cases indirectly that an approach to UNRRA is possible or probable from some other societies, e.g. the British Friends Committee have expressed interest to the military authorities in the establishment of small rehabilitation or convalescent centers for victims of Nazi persecution who have suffered severely in health and morale. It has been suggested that this Committee be advised to discuss the project with UNRRA. This Committee is already working in the British Zone under the British Red Cross. The Vatican Relief Unit and the International Committee of Catholic Charity have been operating in Germany for some time. If it is determined that their future activities will fall within the category of welfare services, they will undoubtedly be advised in time to negotiate an agreement with UNRRA. Baltic and Hungarian groups in Germany have organized Red Cross societies and in one or two cases (Lithuanian and Hungarian) have indicated their desire to discuss proposals with UNRRA. In such cases it is questionable that the primary condition which requires a statement of approval from the responsible government, could be fulfilled. Certainly not in the immediate future. However, it may be possible from time to time to interest other voluntary agencies (e.g. International Red Cross) in the needs of such special groups.

REF ID: A66105
No of Pages 10

Restricted

8 December 1945

Subject: Report of UNRRA teams called forward to 10 July 1945.

To: Theater General Board, G-5 - APC 408

From: Headquarters, UNRRA, U.S. Zone

Attached is a report covering UNRRA teams called forward into Germany from 28 March 1945 to 4 July 1945. No teams were called between 4 July 1945 and 10 July 1945.

It must be borne in mind that a substantial part of these teams were transferred to the British Zone of Occupation when the 21st Army [Group] assumed responsibility.

/s/t/ Alvin R. Guyler
ALVIN R. GUYLER

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APPENDIX NO 6
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Restricted

TEAMS CALLED FORWARD FROM MARCH 28, 1945
TO THE U.S. ZONE

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TEAMS</u>	<u>PERSONS</u>	<u>ARMY</u>
March 28	2	16	12 A Gp
30	4	32	"
April 2	7	56	"
9	4	32	"
9	2	16	6 A Gp
13	7	45	12 A Gp
16	5	30	"
16	3	18	6 A Gp
19	2	13	"
19	11	69	12 A Gp
May 1	3	22	6 A Gp
1	3	21	12 A Gp
2	4	31	"
2	1	7	6 A Gp
2	1	8	12 A Gp
3	3	22	"
3	3	21	6 A Gp
4	3	23	"
4	4	28	12 A Gp
6	1	8	"
6	1	8	6 A Gp
7	4	27	"
11	8	47	12 A Gp
12	5	30	6 A Gp
12	1	6	12 A Gp
13	9	53	"
21	6	47	"
22	4	30	"
23	7	57	"
25	7	53	"
29	7	56	"
30	8	63	"
30	4	32	"
June 1	1	11	"
1	6	62	6 A Gp
13	11	46	12 A Gp
July 4	4	22	"
Total	166	1168	